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The Ninth Circuit and the Protection of
Asylum Seekers Since the Passage of the
Refugee Act of 1980
CAROLYN P. BLUM*
Since the passage of the Refugee Act of 1980, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has played a crucial role
in interpreting and clarifying the Act's asylum and withholding of
deportation provisions. The Article reviews Ninth Circuit decisions
on standard of proof, method of proof, and the five statutory bases
which underlie any claim to asylum or withholding of deportation:
race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social
group, and political opinion. The author also analyzes the court's
interpretation of the term "'persecution" under the asylum and
withholding of deportation provisions. Finally, the author poses
issues for future resolution.
INTRODUCTION
The Refugee Act of 19801 is the cornerstone of United States law
* Lecturer, Boalt Hall School of Law, University of California, Berkeley; Co-Di-
rector, Central American Refugee Defense Fund. B.A. 1971, University of Arizona; J.D.
1976, Northeastern University. The author wishes to thank Ignatius Bau, Laura Rami-
rez, and Barbara Sloan for their invaluable research assistance, and Matthew Ross, Ken
Alex, and Deborah Anker for their thoughtful comments. Support for the research for
this Article was provided by the Ford Foundation.
1. Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (1980) [hereinafter
cited as 1980 Act or Refugee Act], codified at Immigration and Naturalization Act §§
101(a)(42), 207-209, 243(h), 411-414, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(42), 1157-1159, 1253(h),
1521-1524 (1982) [hereinafter cited as INA].
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regarding the protection of persons fleeing persecution.2 The Refugee
Act includes provisions for the admission3 and resettlement 4 of refu-
gees into the United States, the granting of temporary asylum,5 and
thereafter permanent residence to asylum-seekers6 at or within the
borders of the United States, and the withholding or prohibition
against deportation of persons whose lives or freedom would be
threatened if they were ordered to leave the United States.7 These
provisions, in part, are grounded in legal principles articulated in
United Nations treaties concerning refugees."
Since the Refugee Act's passage, the circuit courts of appeals have
played a crucial role in interpreting and clarifying key provisions of
the complex statutory and regulatory refugee and asylum law
scheme.9 In particular, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit, confronted with a large volume of cases arising under
2. See, e.g., Helton, Political Asylum Under the 1980 Refugee Act: An Unful-
filled Promise, 17 U. MicH. J. L. REF. 243 (1984); Note, The Endless Debate: Refugee
Law and Policy and the 1980 Act, 32 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 118 (1983); Comment, Political
Asylum and Withholding of Deportation: Defining the Appropriate Standard of Proof
Under the Refugee Act of 1980, 21 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 171 (1983); Anker & Posner,
The Forty Year Crisis: A Legislative History of the Refugee Act of 1980, 19 SAN DIEGO
L. REV. 9 (1981).
3. INA § 207, 8 U.S.C. § 1157 (1982). INA § 207(a)(3) mandates the admis-
sion on an annual basis of "refugees of special humanitarian concern" to the United
States. Id. § 207(a)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1157(a)(3). The term "refugee" is defined at INA §
101(a)(42), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42). See infra text accompanying note 15. An alien
admitted to the United States pursuant to § 207 is called a "refugee."
4. INA §§ 404-414, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101, 1521-1524 (1982).
5. Id. § 208, 8 U.S.C. § 1158. The Attorney General is required to establish
procedures for aliens in the United States or at ports of entry to apply for asylum. The
first part of this procedure is the eligibility determination: whether the applicant is a
refugee according to the definition at INA § 101(a)(42), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42). See
infra text accompanying note 15. An alien who applies for and receives protection under
these procedures is called an "asylee."
6. INA § 209(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1159(b) (1982).
7. Id. § 243(h), 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h). This section requires the Attorney General
to withhold deportation of any alien to any country where the alien's life or freedom
would be threatened on account of five statutorily-determined factors. These factors are
the same for asylum under § 208 and withholding of deportation. See infra text accom-
panying notes 26-27.
8. United States Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951,
189 U.N.T.S. 137; United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, done
Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, T.I.A.S. No. 6577, 606 U.N.T.S. 267 [hereinafter cited
as Protocol]. The United States ratified the Protocol on October 4, 1968. 114 CONG.
REC. 29, 607 (1968). See infra notes 15 & 27. See generally Martin, Non-Refoulement
of Refugees: United States Compliance with International Obligations, 23 HARV. INT'L
L.J. 357 (1982); Note, Alien's Rights: The Refugee Act of 1980 as Response to the 1967
Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees: The First Test, 14 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L.
561 (1981); Goldman & Martin, International Legal Standards Relating to the Rights
of Aliens and Refugees and United States Immigration Law, 5 HUM. RTs. Q. 302
(1983); Anker & Posner, supra note 2, at 60.
9. See, e.g., Garcia-Mir v. Smith, 766 F.2d 1478 (lth Cir. 1985); Ananeh-
Firempong v. INS, 766 F.2d 621 (Ist Cir. 1985); Carvajal-Munoz v. INS, 743 F.2d 562
(7th Cir. 1984); Marroquin-Manriquez v. INS, 699 F.2d 129 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. de-
nied, 467 U.S. 1259 (1984).
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the Refugee Act,10 has responded with a series of twenty-six pub-
lished and over fifty unpublished decisions" in the five years since
the 1980 Act was passed.1 2 This body of cases directly addresses sev-
eral major issues central to interpretation of the scope of legal pro-
tections for asylum-seekers in the United States,
This Article focuses on Ninth Circuit decisions concerning the
substantive interpretation of the Refugee Act's asylum and withhold-
ing of deportation provisions, the two most crucial statutory sections
for aliens seeking protection from persecution within the United
States. 3 After a brief overview of the relevant Refugee Act provi-
sions in the next section, the Article then surveys Ninth Circuit deci-
10. The Ninth Circuit's large number of immigration cases, in general, and asy-
lum cases, in particular, predominantly emanates from two factors: demographics and
the presence of a major Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) detention center
in El Centro, California. The Ninth Circuit encompasses the western states of California,
Arizona, Nevada, Oregon, Washington, Idaho, and Montana. California is believed to
have the largest undocumented alien population of any state in the United States. See
Cortes, California's Shadow Population: The Impact of Undocumented Immigrants from
Latin American on State Health and Social Service Policies and Programs, A Working
Paper for the California Policy Seminar, Institute for Government Studies, University of
California, Berkeley (Aug. 1985) (citing United States Census Bureau figures).
In particular, 350,000-400,000 Central Americans, many of whom may seek asylum in
the United States, are believed to live in California. Most of the potential asylum-seekers
from Central America have arrived in the United States since conflicts in the region
increased in 1979-1980. See San Francisco Chronicle, Nov. 28, 1985, at 1, col. 1; Id.
Dec. 24, 1985, at 1, col. 1.
Central Americans are the petitioners in almost two-thirds of the reported cases in the
Ninth Circuit in the past five years and almost ninety percent of the unreported cases in
1985 alone. Many of these cases originated when the applicant was detained at the INS
facility in El Centro, where immigration judges conduct hearings for incarcerated detain-
ees. These cases are given priority by the Board of Immigration Appeals for administra-
tive review. Telephone interview with secretary to David Holmes, Chief Attorney Exam-
iner, Board of Immigration Appeals (Mar. 14, 1986).
11. The memorandum decisions of the Ninth Circuit are deemed inappropriate
for publication and may not be cited to or relied upon by the courts of the circuit except
when relevant under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata or collateral estoppel.
9TH CIR. R. 21(c). Nonetheless, this large body of decisions is an important source of
information for assessing the court's concerns-procedural, factual, and legal-regarding
asylum and withholding of deportation determinations. The unpublished cases often ex-
emplify commonly found fact patterns and repetitive legal issues. The holdings of the
unpublished cases also provide insight into the difference in outcome that may result
from variations in presentation of evidence in the underlying case.
12. The Ninth Circuit's disproportionately large caseload of Refugee Act cases is
reflected in the fact that the Ninth Circuit alone is responsible for over 40% of all pub-
lished decisions of the circuit courts on issues of interpretation of Refugee Act provisions
as of the writing of this Article.
13. Consideration of decisions focused on procedural or due process questions are
beyond the scope of this Article. See, e.g., Duran v. INS, 756 F.2d 1338 (9th Cir. 1985);
Ramirez-Gonzalez v. INS, 695 F.2d 1208 (9th Cir. 1983); Medina v. Castillo, 627 F.2d
972 (9th Cir. 1980).
sions analyzing the standard of proof that governs the asylum and
withholding of deportation provisions. Next, the Article reviews
Ninth Circuit interpretation of other key terms in the statutory lan-
guage, in particular the meaning of the term "persecution" and judi-
cial construction of the statutory bases of race, religion, nationality,
membership in a particular social group, and political opinion that
underlie any claim to asylum or withholding of deportation protec-
tion. The following section of the Article considers the implications
of the court's rulings for the preparation and documentation of fu-
ture cases. The Article surveys the Ninth Circuit's view of significant
issues of proof such as the relevance of non-testimonial evidence, in-
cluding general documentary evidence, and the Department of
State's advisory opinion letters. The Article analyzes Ninth Circuit
decisions regarding the applicant's testimony, focusing especially on
the court's view of the requirements for corroboration of the appli-
cant's statement and determinations of the applicant's credibility. A
summary of the decisions discussed in these sections is provided at
the end of each subsection. The Article concludes with discussion of
a few of the areas in which resolution by the circuit court in the
future can be anticipated.
STATUTORY FRAMEWORK
Asylum
The Refugee Act of 1980 is the first United States immigration
statute to explicitly create the right of an alien in the United States
to apply for asylum.14 The statute requires the Attorney General to
establish procedures for determining asylum status, specifying that
the primary criterion is whether the alien-applicant is a "refugee"
within the meaning of section 101(a) (42) (A) of the Immigration and
Nationality Act (INA).
The statute defines a refugee as:
any person who is outside any country of such person's nationality or, in the
case of a person having no nationality, is outside any country in which such
person last habitually resided, and who is unable to avail himself or herself
of the protection of, that country because of persecution or a well-founded
fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in
a particular social group, or political opinion.15
14. Prior to the Refugee Act, asylum was provided only by regulation. 8 C.F.R. §
108 (1975), revoked, 46 Fed. Reg. 45,117 (1981).
15. INA § 101(a)(42)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (1982). Congress explicitly
conformed the definition of a refugee in the Refugee Act of 1980 to that found in Article
I of the Protocol. See Protocol, supra note 8, at 6225. S. REP. No. 256, 96th Cong., 1st
Sess. 4 (1979); H.R. REp. No. 608, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 9, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 141. Another subsection defining a refugee who is still within his or
her country of origin is not germane to this discussion. INA § 101(a)(42)(B), 8 U.S.C. §
1101(a)(42)(B) (1982).
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After determining the asylum-seeker's eligibility as a statutorily-de-
fined "refugee," the Attorney General or his designee can grant or
deny asylum as a matter of discretion. 6
The regulations implementing section 208 of the INA specify
three procedures for asylum applications. An asylum-seeker may ap-
ply for protection with an Immigration and Naturalization Service
(INS) District Director if he or she is in the United States or at a
land border or port of entry, and if exclusion and deportation pro-
ceedings have not yet commenced.11 If the first approach is unsuc-
cessful, the asylum-seeker may resubmit his or her application for
asylum to an immigration judge in subsequent exclusion or deporta-
tion proceedings.18 Finally, even after exclusion or deportation pro-
ceedings have been initiated, an asylum request can be submitted for
the first time to the immigration judge.I9
The immigration judge's decision on all matters subsumed within
the deportation hearing, including the asylum request, is subject to
administrative review by the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA or
Board) 20 and judicial review in the circuit courts of appeals. 2' Exclu-
sion proceedings are subject to administrative review by the BIA and
judicial review through habeas corpus petition to the federal district
court.22 If an application for asylum is successful under any of the
procedures described above, the alien (termed an "asylee") is eligi-
ble, after one year elapses, for permanent residence in the United
States.3
16. See, e.g., In re Salim, 18 I. & N. Dec. 311 (BIA 1982); Helton, The Role of
Discretion in Political Asylum, 22 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 999 (1985).
17. 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.1, 208.3(a)(1985). See generally INA §§ 236, 242, 8 U.S.C.§§ 1226, 1252 (1982). Exclusion proceedings are instituted against aliens seeking entry
and admission into the United States. Deportation proceedings are initiated against
aliens already in the United States to determine if they should be expelled from the
United States.
18. 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.1, 208.3(b), 208.9 (1985).
19. Id. §§ 208.1, 208.3(b), 208.10.
20. Id. § 3.1(b).
21. INA § 106(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1105(a) (1982). See generally Foti v. INS, 375
U.S. 217 (1963).
22. INA § 106(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1105(b) (1982).
23. Id. § 209(h), 8 U.S.C. § 1159(b). A grant of asylum may be terminated prior
to the obtaining of permanent residence if a "change in circumstances in the alien's
country of nationality" warrants a finding that he is no longer a refugee within the statu-
tory meaning. Id. § 208(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b); 8 C.F.R. § 208.15 (1985).
Withholding of Deportation
Since 1952, the Immigration and Naturalization Act has allowed
the discretionary withholding of deportation of an alien who would
be subject to persecution if returned to his or her homeland.24 In the
Refugee Act of 1980 this provision was revised as follows:
The Attorney General shall not deport or return any alien (other than an
alien described in section 241(a)(19))2" to a country, if the Attorney Gen-
eral determines that such alien's life or freedom would be threatened in
such a country on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a
particular social group or political opinion.2"
The revision transformed section 243(h) into a mandatory rem-
edy, removing discretion from the Attorney General or his desig-
nee.2 7 If the criterion is met,28 the alien cannot be deported to the
country where persecution is more likely than not to occur except in
limited situations. An exception is made for persons who pose a
threat to national security, have committed serious crimes, or have
persecuted others.29
An application for withholding of deportation can only be made in
an exclusion or deportation hearing. 0 The same form, the 1-589, is
used to apply for asylum and for withholding of deportation. 31 A
decision on a withholding application is subject to review-both ad-
ministrative and judicial-pursuant to the same statutory provisions
as the decision on the deportation and exclusion hearing. 2 The
24. The 1952 Act required the alien to be subject to "physical persecution." INA
of 1952 § 243(h), 66 Stat. 163, 214 (1952). In 1965, this phrase was replaced with "by
persecution on account of race, religion or political opinion." Pub. L. No. 89-236, § 11,
79 Stat. 911, 918 (1965).
25. INA § 241(a)(19), 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(19) (1982). The exception refers to
aliens deportable because of their participation with the Nazis in the persecution of
others from 1933-1945.
26. Id. § 243(h), 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h).
27. The 1980 revision was intended to bring the United States statutory language
into conformity with Article 33 of the 1951 United Nations Convention on the Status of
Refugees which prohibits the expulsion or return (non-refoulement) of "a refugee in any
manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be
threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social
group or political opinion." See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 781, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 20,
reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 161. The United States is bound by
the Convention since the Protocol incorporated Convention Articles 2 through 34. Proto-
col, supra note 8, at 6260. Note that Article 33 refers to a prohibition against return of a
refugee to the country where his life or freedom would be threatened whereas § 243(h)
refers to an alien needing the same protection.
28. Le., an alien's life or freedom would be threatened on account of race, reli-
gion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.
29. INA § 243(h)(2)(A-D), 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)(A-D) (1982).
30. 8 C.F.R. § 242.17(c) (1985).
31. Id. § 208.3(b).
32. See supra notes 20-21. See generally Cheng Fan Kwok v. INS, 392 U.S. 206(1968); Foti v. INS, 375 U.S. 217 (1963); Londono-Gomez v. INS, 699 F.2d 475 (9th
Cir. 1984).
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Ninth Circuit has emphasized the mandatory nature of this impor-
tant protection remedy and has stated that "[t]he form of relief
mandated by the amended section 243(h) is better described as a
prohibition against deportation. 33
DECISIONS OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT
Introduction
Judicial construction of each component of the asylum and with-
holding of deportation provisions helps to define the scope and
breadth of these remedies. Applications for the benefits of both stat-
utory sections make reference to similar or identical factors. For
both asylum and withholding of deportation protection, an applicant
must prove, 34 by the applicable standard, that he or she fears perse-
cution, or that his or her life or freedom would be threatened if re-
turned to his or her home country.35 He or she must demonstrate
that the persecution or the threat results from one of five statutory
bases: race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social
group, or political opinion. Only an application premised on one of
these five bases will be accepted as within the statutory mandate of
either asylum or withholding of deportation.
The standard of proof governing asylum and withholding of depor-
tation is the key factor in the success of the applicant in proving his
claim for protection. How much and what kind of evidence the appli-
cant is required to provide, and what criteria the trier of fact and the
reviewing court should use in evaluating that evidence, are the cen-
tral questions posed by the standard of proof issue. In addition, the
courts have examined whether asylum and withholding of deporta-
33. Bolanos-Hernandez v. INS, 767 F.2d 1277, 1282 (9th Cir. 1985); accord
Hernandez-Ortiz v. INS, 777 F.2d 509, 513 (9th Cir. 1985); Maroufi v. INS, 772 F.2d
597, 598 n.1 (9th Cir. 1985).
34. The burden of proof is on the applicant under both asylum and withholding of
deportation provisions. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.5, 242.17(c) (1985).
35. Asylum provisions also make reference to the alien who has no nationality
and who is unwilling to return to his country of last habitual residence. INA §
101(a)(42), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (1982); 8 C.F.R. § 208.13 (1985). In addition, since
an asylum application can be denied because an alien has been "firmly resettled" in
another country, the issue of the applicant's ability to live without risk in that country
may also be at issue in the course of review of his application. See 8 C.F.R. §§
208.8(f)(1)(ii), 208.8(0(2), 208.14 (1985). Withholding of deportation provisions pro-
hibit deportation to a country where the alien-applicant's life or freedom would be
threatened. INA § 243(h), 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (1982). As a practical matter, however,
asylum and withholding of deportation cases predominantly concern the need to prevent
return to the alien's homeland.
tion applications are governed by the same standard and if not, what
the significant difference is between the two standards. These ques-
tions regarding proof are not mere semantic problems. The court's
explicit statements regarding proof are important signposts for the
administrative agency in its day-to-day review of thousands of asy-
lum and withholding of deportation cases.
In this section, the Article will examine the jurisprudence of the
Ninth Circuit regarding each of the three major elements that con-
stitute the substance of the statutory remedies of asylum and with-
holding of deportation: the standard of proof that governs each rem-
edy, the meaning of persecution (and, to the extent it differs, the
concept of threat to life or freedom), and the five statutorily-defined
bases of protection.
Standard of Proof
Before 1980, the courts and the BIA described in a variety of
ways the standard of proof required to substantiate a withholding of
deportation request under section 243(h).36 Both most commonly
formulated a standard articulated as "the clear probability of perse-
cution" test.3 7 The 1980 Act, however, amended section 243(h) and
created a statutory asylum procedure based on eligibility as a refu-
gee, that is, one who has a "well-founded fear of persecution. ' 38 As a
result, the crucial questions became: (1) Would the clear probability
standard continue to apply to withholding of deportation requests?
(2) Would the clear probability test also apply to asylum requests?
(3) Did the use of the "well-founded fear of persecution" standard in
the refugee definition signal a change to a less burdensome standard
of proof for asylum and withholding of deportation? 9
The BIA maintained that the statutory revisions of the 1980 Act
did not change the standard of proof governing withholding of depor-
tation requests. 0 Indeed, the BIA held that the same standard, clear
probability of persecution, applied to both section 243(h) withhold-
ing of deportation requests and considerations for asylum protection
36. See, e.g., INS v. Stevic, 104 S. Ct. 2489, 2495 n.12 (1984); Martineau v.
INS, 556 F.2d 306, 307 & n.2 (5th Cir. 1977) ("clear probability of persecution" and
"likelihood of persecution"); Kovac v. INS, 407 F.2d 102, 105, 107 (9th Cir. 1969)
("probability of persecution" and "likelihood").
37. See, e.g., In re Dunar, 14 I. & N. Dec. 310, 318-19 (BIA 1973) (accession to
the Protocol did not change the applicability of the "clear probability of persecution"
standard to § 243(h) determinations).
38. See supra text accompanying notes 14-33.
39. See supra text accompanying note 15. See also infra text accompanying notes
40-57.
40. See, e.g., In re Lam, 18 I. & N. Dec. 15, 17 n.3 (BIA 1981); In re McMul-
len, 17 I. & N. Dec. 542, 544 (BIA 1980), rev'd on other grounds, 658 F.2d 1312, 1317
(9th Cir. 1981) ("an applicant for ... § 243(h) ... must show that ... he would be
subject to persecution ...").
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under the newly-enacted section 208 provisions.4
Prior to 1984, the Ninth Circuit decisions did not clearly indicate
the court's position on the standard of proof issue.42 For example, in
McMullen v. INS,," the court applied "a likelihood of persecution"
standard without any elaboration or explicit reference to the "clear
probability" test.""
Conflict on the standard of proof issue eventually erupted between
the Second and Third Circuits.45 The Second Circuit, in Stevic v.
Sava, took the position that "with the passage of the 1980 Act, the
'clear probability' test is no longer the applicable guide for adminis-
trative practice under section 243(h) . . . [since the] 1980 Act thor-
oughly undercuts the reasoning of Dunar . ... ',4 Although the
court declined to articulate with precision the content of the stan-
dard required under the Refugee Act, it stated "[b]oth the text and
the history of [the Refugee Act] strongly suggest that asylum may
be granted, and, under section 243(h), deportation must be withheld,
upon a showing far short of 'clear probability' that an individual will
be singled out for persecution."'47
The Third Circuit unequivocally rejected this view in Rejaie v.
INS.48 The Rejaie court ruled that the Second Circuit's Stevic deci-
sion was erroneous because "[i]t attributed a stringency to the
phrase 'clear probability' that was not consistent with [other
cases]. . . -49 The court added that the Second Circuit "failed to
appreciate case law consensus that the [clear probability and well-
41. In re Martinez-Romero, 18 I. & N. Dec. 75, 78 (BIA 1982), aff'd, 692 F.2d
595 (9th Cir. 1984); accord In re Portales, 18 I. & N. Dec. 239, 241 (BIA 1982) ("to
meet [h]is burden of proof [under § 208], an alien must demonstrate a clear probability
that he will be persecuted").
42. See, e.g., Zavala-Bonilla v. INS, 730 F.2d 562, 565 n.4 (9th Cir. 1984) (court
rejects proposition that "continuing and contemporaneous cognizance" is required to
prove likelihood of persecution but does not discuss "clear probability" standard);
Samimi v. INS, 714 F.2d 992, 995 (9th Cir. 1983) (court uses "likelihood that he would
be persecuted" and "he would be a target of government persecution" tests without refer-
ence to debate regarding "well-founded fear" or "clear probability").
43. 658 F.2d 1312 (9th Cir. 1981).
44. Id. at 1315. The court did find that the standard of review for withholding of
deportation cases was changed by the Refugee Act revisions. A decision regarding the
mandatory withholding of deportation can no longer be reviewed under an abuse of dis-
cretion standard, but must be reviewed under the more stringent substantial evidence
test. Id. at 1316-17.
45. Compare Stevie v. Sava, 678 F.2d 401 (2d Cir. 1981) with Rejaie v. INS,
691 F.2d 139 (3d Cir. 1982).
46. Stevic, 678 F.2d at 409.
47. Id.; accord Reyes v. INS, 693 F.2d 597 (6th Cir. 1982).
48. 691 F.2d 139 (3d Cir. 1982).
49. Id. at 146.
founded fear] standards were equivalent . . . and [it] misappre-
hended the legislative history of the 1968 accession to the Protocol
and the Refugee Act of 1980."'50 The court ruled that "well-founded
fear" is equivalent to "clear probability" and should be used as the
standard for determining section 243(h) claims.51
On appeal from the Second Circuit, in INS v. Stevic, 52 the United
States Supreme Court issued its first ruling on Refugee Act issues.
The Court rejected the approaches of both the Second and Third
Circuits. The Court ruled that asylum and withholding of deporta-
tion are distinct remedies, and thus are not governed by standards of
proof that make reference to each other.83
Since Stevic sought review only of the denial of a motion to reopen
to apply for section 243(h) relief, the Court ruled that it was not
confronted with the question of the proper standard of proof for asy-
lum. 54 As to the section 243(h) determination, the Court held that
the "clear probability" standard should continue to apply.55 The
Court was unconvinced that either accession to the Protocol in 1968
or the passage of the Refugee Act effected any fundamental change
regarding the section 243(h) standard of proof.L56 The Court en-
dorsed a test for section 243(h) eligibility requiring proof that the
applicant "more likely than not" would be subject to persecution on
one of the specified grounds, a standard the justices viewed as "a
familiar one to immigration authorities and reviewing courts. 57
Since the Stevic decision, the Ninth Circuit has rendered a series
of opinions which chart its position on the standard of proof issues. 58
50. Id.
51. Id. Even after the conflict emerged, the Ninth Circuit declined to enter the
debate. See, e.g., Shoaee v. INS, 704 F.2d 1079, 1084 (9th Cir. 1983) ("we do not need
to reach the standard for the asylum issue, however, because we hold the Shoaee's claim
would fail even under the test articulated by the Stevic court").
52. 104 S. Ct. 2489 (1984).
53. Id. at 2498, 2500.
54. Id. at 2501. The only guidance provided by the Court regarding its view of
the well-founded fear standard is the following dictum: "For purposes of our analysis, we
may assume, as the Court of Appeals concluded, that the well-founded fear standard is
more generous than the clear probability of persecution standard .... " Id. at 2498.
55. Id. at 2501.
56. Id. at 2500 & n.22. But see supra note 27.
57. 104 S. Ct. at 2498, 2501. The Court noted that the term "clear probability"
was used interchangeably with "likelihood of persecution" and that the use of the word
"clear" appears to have been surplusage. Id. at 2498 n.19.
58. Hernandez-Ortiz v. INS, 777 F.2d 509 (9th Cir. 1985); Del Valle v. INS,
776 F.2d 1407 (9th Cir. 1985); Garcia-Ramos v. INS, 775 F.2d 1370 (9th Cir. 1985);
Lopez v. INS, 775 F.2d 1015 (9th Cir. 1985); Estrada v. INS, 775 F.2d 1018 (9th Cir.
1985); Chatila v. INS, 770 F.2d 786 (9th Cir. 1985); Cardoza-Fonseca v. INS, 767 F.2d
1448 (9th Cir. 1985), cert. granted, 54 U.S.L.W. 3561 (U.S. Feb. 25, 1986) (No. 85-
782); Sarvia-Quintanilla v. INS, 767 F.2d 1387 (9th Cir. 1985); Bolanos-Hernandez v.
INS, 749 F.2d 1316 (9th Cir. 1984), as amended, 767 F.2d 1277 (9th Cir. 1985);
Sagermark v. INS, 767 F.2d 645 (9th Cir. 1985); Argueta v. INS, 759 F.2d 1395 (9th
Cir. 1985).
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Read together, these decisions require the application of the more
lenient "well-founded fear" of persecution standard to adjudication
of asylum applications and the more burdensome "clear probability"
standard to withholding of deportation requests.5 9 The cases provide
elaborate description of what is actually meant by each of these
terms.
In Bolanos-Hernandez v. INS, 0 the court first reviewed the statu-
tory provisions relevant to asylum and withholding of deportation in
light of Stevic, and addressed the Supreme Court's reference to the
well-founded fear standard for asylum cases.61 In an opinion by
Judge Reinhardt, the court stated that "the well-founded fear stan-
dard is in fact more generous than the clear probability test. The
difference in language . . . strongly supports the conclusion that the
standard of [section 208] is more liberal."62
The court attempted to define the term "well-founded fear" by
reference to other sources of law63 and in contrast to the "clear
probability" requirement.6 4 It concluded that "an alien entitled to
relief under section 243(h) will have established the clear probability
59. See, e.g., Cardoza-Fonseca v. INS, 767 F.2d 1448 (9th Cir. 1985), cert.
granted, 54 U.S.L.W. 3561 (U.S. Feb. 25, 1986) (No. 85-782). The other circuits have
widely varied views on this issue. The Third Circuit continues to maintain its view that
the two standards are identical. Sankar v. INS, 757 F.2d 532, 533 (3d Cir. 1985); Sotto
v. INS, 748 F.2d 832, 836 (3d Cir. 1984). The Sixth Circuit has stated that well-
founded fear requires a lesser showing than clear probability. Youkhanna v. INS, 749
F.2d 360, 362 (6th Cir. 1984). However, it has also stated that asylum requests made or
renewed in deportation or exclusion proceedings should be judged under the clear
probability standard. Daily v. INS, 744 F.2d 1191, 1196 n.6 (6th Cir. 1984). The Fifth
Circuit has described the well-founded fear standard as "possibly more lenient" but re-
quired a showing that the applicant "will be persecuted. . ." to receive reopening (i.e., a
new hearing for § 243(h) or § 208 relief). Quan-Young v. INS, 759 F.2d 450, 456 (5th
Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 412 (1985). The Seventh and Eleventh Circuits agree
with the Ninth Circuit that the two standards are not identical. Carvajal-Munoz v. INS,
743 F.2d 562, 575 (7th Cir. 1984); Garcia-Mir v. Smith, 766 F.2d 1478, 1490 (1 1th Cir.
1985).
60. 749 F.2d 1316 (9th Cir. 1984), as amended on denial of reh'g and of reh'g en
banc, 767 F.2d 1277 (9th Cir. 1985).
61. See supra note 59.
62. 767 F.2d at 1282.
63. Id. at 1283 n.11. These sources of law include other court decisions, law re-
view articles, and the UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES, HAND-
BOOK ON PROCEDURES AND CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING REFUGEE STATUS (1979) [here-
inafter cited as HANDBOOK]. The Ninth Circuit has looked to the Handbook as a
significant source of guidance to the meaning of the terms in the Protocol. See supra note
8; Hernandez-Ortiz v. INS, 777 F.2d 509, 514 n.3 (9th Cir. 1985); Zavala-Bonilla v.
INS, 730 F.2d 562, 567 n.7 (9th Cir. 1984); McMullen v. INS, 658 F.2d 1312, 1319
(9th Cir. 1981).
64. 767 F.2d at 1283.
that his or her life or freedom is actually threatened, while an alien
who qualifies under section 208(a) may have only established the
existence of a valid reason for fear."'65 As a procedural matter the
court found that the section 243(h) claim should be reviewed first
since "if the court concludes that the alien met the clear probability
standard, it need go no farther since the well-founded fear standard
will, a fortiori, also have been met."'66
In analyzing Bolanos' withholding of deportation request under
section 243(h), the court also established a relatively lenient eviden-
tiary burden under the "clear probability" standard.6 7 For example,
it stated that general documentary evidence regarding oppressive
conditions is relevant to support more specific evidence of the alien's
likelihood of persecution. 6 Further, the court held that uncorrobo-
rated statements alleging prior threats are sufficient to satisfy the
section 243(h) withholding standard. 9 The court held that Bolanos
satisfied the clear probability test and thus a fortiori had satisfied
the well-founded fear test. Thus, the court's statements on the well-
founded fear standard probably should be regarded as dicta.70
In Cardoza-Fonseca v. INS,7  however, the petitioner appealed
only the denial of asylum relief under section 208.72 The court was,
therefore, faced with rendering a definitive ruling on the section 208
asylum standard of proof. In Cardoza-Fonseca, also authored by
Judge Reinhardt, the court's textual analysis of section 243(h) and
section 208 reinforced its previously stated view that the standards of
proof for the two forms of relief are not identical. Further, the court
held that "[t]here is a significant practical consequence to the fact
that different analyses are required under the two standards. a7 3 In
contrasting the two standards, Judge Reinhardt wrote:
65. Id. The court also stated its belief that "an evaluation of whether an alien has
a well-founded fear includes consideration of the alien's state of mind . . . as well as an
evaluation of 'conditions in the country of origin, its laws and the experiences of others'
.... 'A desire to avoid a situation entailing the risk of persecution may be enough' to
satisfy the well-founded fear test." (citations omitted). Id. n.11.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 1283-86. The court emphasized that the form of relief provided by the
amended mandatory § 243(h) provision is more appropriately described as a "prohibition
against deportation" rather than a "withholding of deportation." Id. at 1282.
68. Id. at 1285-86 ("general corroborative evidence, such as documentary evi-
dence may be most useful [to evaluate if a threat should be taken seriously]"). See infra
text accompanying notes 188-95.
69. 767 F.2d at 1285 ("[a]uthentic refugees rarely are able to offer direct corrob-
oration of specific threats"). See infra text accompanying notes 221-28; accord Medrano-
Martinez v. INS, No. 84-7206 (9th Cir. Nov. 15, 1985).
70. 767 F.2d at 1288.
71. 767 F.2d 1448 (9th Cir. 1985), cert. granted, 54 U.S.L.W. 3561 (U.S. Feb.
25, 1986) (No. 85-782).
72. Id. at 1450.
73. Id. at 1452.
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The term "clear probability" requires a showing that there is a greater-
than-fifty-percent chance of persecution. In contrast, the term "well-
founded fear" requires that (1) the alien have a subjective fear, and (2)
that this fear have enough of a basis that it can be considered well-founded.
While in the latter case there must be some objective basis for the fear,
contrary to the requirement of the "clear probability" test the likelihood of
the fear need not be greater than fifty percent.74
The court rejected the government's interpretation that the "well-
founded fear" standard "is rendered entirely subjective." 75 Instead,
the court ruled that in order to satisfy the well-founded fear
standard:
Applicants must point to specific, objective facts that support an inference
of past persecution or risk of future persecution. That the objective facts
[can be] established through the credible and persuasive testimony of the
applicant does not make those facts less objective . . . . It is only after
objective evidence sufficient to suggest a risk of persecution has been intro-
duced that the alien's subjective fears and desire to avoid the risk-laden
situation in his or her native land became relevant.78
By fashioning a realistic standard for determining asylum claims,
the court emphasized its concern that the humanitarian motives of
the Refugee Act of 1980 to protect genuine refugees would not be
defeated by "stringent documentary requirement[s]. '"7 The court's
clear articulation of the well-founded fear standard supports its oft-
stated view that asylum-seekers are faced with extremely difficult
problems of prooL 8
In remanding Cardoza-Fonseca to the BIA for reconsideration of
the section 208 request under the well-founded fear standard, the
court was critical of the BIA's use of purportedly alternative stan-
74. Id. at 1452-53.
75. 767 F.2d at 1453 (emphasis added). The United States Supreme Court had
characterized Stevic's position in this same manner. Stevic, 104 S. Ct. at 2492-93
("[Stevic] argues that . . .the well-founded-fear-of-persecution standard turns almost
entirely on the alien's state of mind").
76. 767 F.2d at 1453.
77. Id. Review of § 208 decisions involves a two-step analysis. The decision re-
garding eligibility as a refugee for asylum protection will be reviewed under a substantial
evidence standard of review. See supra note 44. The grant or denial of asylum as a
matter of discretion will be reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. Garcia-Ra-
mos v. INS, 775 F.2d 1370, 1374 (9th Cir. 1985); Estrada v. INS, 775 F.2d 1018, 1021
(9th Cir. 1985); Chatila v. INS, 770 F.2d 786, 789 (9th Cir. 1985); Bolanos-Hernandez
v. INS, 767 F.2d 1277, 1282 n.9 (9th Cir. 1985).
78. See, e.g., Bolanos-Hernandez, 767 F.2d at 1285 ("persecutors are hardly
likely to provide their victims with affidavits attesting to their acts of persecution");
Zavala-Bonilla v. INS, 730 F.2d 562, 565 (9th Cir. 1984) ("[the applicant] could hardly
ask authorities in El Salvador to certify that she would be persecuted should she
return").
dards of proof.79 The Board had ruled that Cardoza-Fonseca's claim
that she "would be persecuted" failed under the "clear probability,"
"good reason," or "realistic likelihood" test."0 The court found the
Board's ruling to be disingenuous because the Board had clearly
held, in In re Acosta,8' that there is no difference between the clear
probability and well-founded fear standards.8 2 The Ninth Circuit
ruled that the Board's error could not be cured by de novo review by
the court under the correct standard. Instead, reconsideration by the
BIA under the proper standard was required.8 3
In decisions following Bolanos-Hernandez and Cardoza-Fonseca,
the court has consistently applied the separate and distinct standards
of proof to section 208 and section 243(h) requests.84 In distinguish-
ing between the two standards of proof, it continues to emphasize
that asylum requires a showing of a possibility of persecution, but
withholding of deportation requires a showing of a probability or
likelihood of persecution.8 5 For example, in Garcia-Ramos v. INS,
where the court rejected the applicant's proof as insufficient to fulfill
the higher degree of probability of persecution required by section
243(h), the court nonetheless found sufficient evidence to establish a
well-founded fear of persecution, if the applicant's testimony was
believable.86
79. Cardoza-Fonseca, 767 F.2d at 1454.
80. Id. at 1450.
81. Interim Dec. 2986 (BIA Mar. 1, 1985).
82. Id. at 19-20; Cardoza-Fonseca 767 F.2d at 1454 ("the Board appears to feel
that it is exempt from the holding of Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803)
and not constrained by circuit court opinions").
83. Cardoza-Fonseca, 767 F.2d at 1455.
84. See, e.g., Hernandez-Ortiz v. INS, 777 F.2d 509 (9th Cir. 1985); Garcia-
Ramos v. INS, 775 F.2d 1370 (9th Cir. 1985); Lopez v. INS, 775 F.2d 1015 (9th Cir.
1985); Estrada v. INS, 775 F.2d 1018 (9th Cir. 1985); Chatila v. INS, 770 F.2d 786
(9th Cir. 1985); Cruz-Canales v. INS, No. 84-7075 (9th Cir. Nov. 21, 1985); Medrano-
Martinez v. INS, No. 84-7206 (9th Cir. Nov. 15, 1985); Lopez-Calderon v. INS, No.
84-7362 (9th Cir. Nov. 13, 1985); Rosales-Perez v. INS, No. 83-7278 (9th Cir. Oct. 8,
1985); Figueroa-Polio v. INS, No. 84-7240 (9th Cir. Aug. 20, 1985).
85. Garcia-Ramos, 775 F.2d at 1370; accord Hernandez-Ortiz, 777 F.2d at 509.
The reported and unreported decisions emphasize that "well-founded fear" is a more
generous standard. See, e.g., Lopez-Calderon v. INS, No. 84-7362, slip op. at 2-3 (9th
Cir. Nov. 13, 1985); Rosales-Perez v. INS, No. 83-7278, slip op. at 3 (9th Cir. Oct. 8,
1985).
86. Garcia-Ramos, 775 F.2d at 1374. The court stated:
[T]he phrase "well-founded fear" embodies both subjective and objective ele-
ments .... The word "fear" connotes subjective considerations ... thus re-
quiring an evaluation of an applicant's state of mind .... That the fear must
be "well-founded" implicates a requirement of objective reasonableness. In
other words, there must be some basis in reality or reasonable possibility that a
petitioner would be persecuted .... In this regard, the "conditions in the
country of origin, its laws, and the experience of others" are relevant factors to
consider.
The court cited Bolanos-Hernandez, 767 F.2d at 1282-83 & n.11, and HANDBOOK,
supra note 63, 1 37, for the principles in its description of the well-founded fear standard;
340
[VOL 23: 327, 1986] Ninth Circuit and Asylum Seekers
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
The court remanded the case to the Board explicitly stating that if
Garcia-Ramos' testimony was found credible, he had met his burden
of proof for asylum. The court remanded to the BIA to review the
record in light of the legal standards articulated by the court, to cor-
rect any factual errors (specifically pointing out one factual error in
the decision), and to make the required credibility findings. 87 Simi-
larly, in the unpublished case of Medrano-Martinez v. INS, the
court remanded to the Board for a credibility determination where
"it [was] unclear whether the BIA evaluated the petitioner's claim
discretely under the appropriate standards." '88 The court advised the
Board to evaluate the withholding of deportation claim under the
proper standards and then review the asylum claim under the more
generous "well-founded fear" standard.89
In Chatila v. INS,90 however, the panel disagreed with the view-
point that the circuit court must remand the case to the Board in
instances where the Board opinion uses alternative language or is
unclear in its description of the standard of proof it has applied. The
Board's decision in Chatila rejected, as it had in Cardoza-Fonseca,
the applicant's claim "whether we apply a standard of 'clear
probability,' 'good reason' or 'clear likelihood.' "91 The Chatila court
ruled that use of the alternative language was a recognition by the
BIA of the difference between the clear probability and well-founded
fear standards.92 Further, the Chatila decision makes no explicit ref-
erence to the BIA's holding in In re Acosta that the governing stan-
dards of proof are identical for both forms of relief from deporta-
tion.93 This was the position specifically rejected by the Cardoza-
Fonseca panel, which ordered a remand to the BIA for consideration
accord Hernandez-Ortiz v. INS, 777 F.2d 509, 513 (9th Cir. 1985); Lopez-Calderon v.
INS, No. 84-7362, slip op. at 3 (9th Cir. Nov. 13, 1985).
87. Garcia-Ramos, 775 F.2d at 1374-75.
88. Medrano-Martinez v. INS, No. 84-7206, slip op. at 3 (9th Cir. Nov. 15,
1985).
89. Id. at 3. See also Cruz-Canales v. INS, No. 84-7075, slip op. at 2 (9th Cir.
Nov. 21, 1985) (court ordered remand to BIA "in light of recent decisions of this circuit
regarding the definition of 'well-founded fear of persecution'" and to consider evidence
of petitioner's public radio statement of criticism of Salvadoran government).
90. 770 F.2d 786 (9th Cir. 1985).
91. Id. at 790.
92. Id.
93. See also Lopez-Calderon v. INS, No. 84-7362, slip op. at 3 (9th Cir. Nov. 13,
1985) ("the correct burden of proof was applied by the BIA and the Immigration
Judge"); Lopez v. INS, 775 F.2d 1015 (9th Cir. 1985) (the BIA expressly stated that it
applied the "lesser standard" of good reason to fear persecution); Sorto-Castro v. INS,
No. 83-7690 (9th Cir. Sept. 4, 1985); Ballardes v. INS, No. 84-7340 (9th Cir. Aug. 9,
1985).
of the asylum request under the correct legal standard.94
Summary
The United States Supreme Court decision in INS v. Stevic re-
quires an evaluation of an application for withholding of deportation
under the "clear probability" or "more likely than not" standard of
proof.9 5 The Stevic decision left open the question of the standard of
proof applicable to asylum under section 208.96
The Ninth Circuit has elaborated on the meaning of the "clear
probability" test. In Bolanos-Hernandez, the court ruled that a
"clear probability of persecution" could be established by a peti-
tioner's testimony of direct threats of persecution, even if presented
without independent corroborating evidence.97 In addition, the court
ruled that general documentary evidence about oppressive condi-
tions, coupled with specific testimony and evidence of the alien's like-
lihood of persecution can satisfy the standard of proof requirements
under section 243(h).98
As to asylum under section 208, the Ninth Circuit has clearly
stated that the first step of an asylum determination is to ascertain
the applicant's eligibility as a "refugee." A refugee must establish
that he or she has a "well-founded fear of persecution," a standard
which the court unequivocally has held is "more generous" than the
clear probability of persecution standard.9 To demonstrate well-
founded fear, a refugee must show his subjective fear of persecution
is genuine and that the fear is objectively reasonable. An applicant's
own statement may provide that objective basis when it details the
bases for this fear of persecution. The desire to avoid a situation
entailing the risk of persecution may satisfy the well-founded fear
standard. This standard for asylum is concerned with the possibility
of persecution; the clear probability standard for withholding of de-
portation is concerned with the probability of persecution. 100
The Ninth Circuit has not developed a uniform position regarding
the remedy available to the applicant if the underlying BIA decision
does not articulate the standard applied in its review of the asylum
and withholding application or if the BIA applied an incorrect stan-
dard. For example, in Cardoza-Fonseca, the Ninth Circuit addressed
94. See supra text accompanying notes 79-83. Cf. Rosales-Perez v. INS, No. 83-
7728 (9th Cir. Oct. 8, 1985) (Nelson, J., dissenting) (where BIA made no explicit ruling
on standard it used to assess asylum application, decision was difficult to review on ap-
peal and should be remanded for application of proper standard).
95. See supra text accompanying notes 55-57.
96. See supra text accompanying notes 53-54.
97. See supra text accompanying note 69.
98. See supra text accompanying note 68.
99. See supra text accompanying note 62.
100. See supra text accompanying notes 73-76.
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the content and meaning of the well-founded fear standard and the
appropriate remedy. The court ruled that the BIA's finding in In re
Acosta that asylum applications are not governed by the distinct,
more liberal well-founded fear standard, was in contravention of
Ninth Circuit holdings and thus required remand of an asylum re-
quest to the BIA for consideration under the appropriate well-
founded fear standard. 01 But in several other cases, the Ninth Cir-
cuit panel evaluated the applications for asylum and withholding of
deportation under the correct standard and did not order a remand
for the Board to engage in a similar analysis. 02
Persecution
Scope and Nature of Persecution
To substantiate a request for asylum under section 208, an alien
must demonstrate that he or she has a "well-founded fear of perse-
cution;" to obtain withholding of deportation, an alien must show
that "his life or freedom would be threatened."' 0 3
In Cardoza-Fonseca, the Ninth Circuit ruled that:
The term "persecution" includes more than just restrictions on life and lib-
erty .... [T]he statutory term "persecution" in the "well-founded fear of
persecution" standard encompasses more than the statutory term "threat to
life or freedom" and thus more than the non-statutory term "persecution"
used in the judicially established "clear probability of persecution"
standard.'14
The legal distinction between "persecution" and "threat to life or
freedom," as articulated in Cardoza-Fonseca, appears to be a by-
product of the Stevic ruling that the asylum and withholding of de-
portation remedies are distinct. But no other court decisions either
before or after Stevic have compared the two terms or interpreted
101. See supra text accompanying notes 79-83.
102. Compare cases cited supra notes 90 & 93 with cases cited supra notes 85 &
89.
103. See INA § 243(h), 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (1982) and text accompanying note
15.
104. Cardoza-Fonseca, 767 F.2d at 1452; cf. INS v. Stevic, 104 S. Ct. 2489, 2500
n.22 (1984) (Persecution is a "seemingly broader concept than threat to life or free-
dom"). HANDBOOK, supra note 63, % 51 ("[flrom Article 33 of the 1951 Convention, it
may be inferred that a threat to life or freedom ... is always persecution. Other serious
violations of human rights ... would also constitute persecution"). Contra In re Lam,
18 I.& N. Dec. 15, 17 n.3 (BIA 1981) ("[a]lthough section 243(h) was amended by the
Refugee Act to substitute 'life or freedom would be threatened' for 'persecution' we have,
after examining the legislative history of the new Act, held that this broader choice of
words in the Refugee Act was not intended to change the prior law requiring persecution
by the government. . .") (emphasis added).
the phrase "threat to life or freedom."' 10 5 For all practical purposes,
judicial construction of the term "persecution" is the only guide to
the court's interpretation of both the phrases "persecution" and
"threat to life and freedom," since "threat to life and freedom" has
not been construed to have a definitive meaning independent of a
reference to the term "persecution."106 Therefore, cases, even those
that predate the Refugee Act of 1980, that discuss the term "perse-
cution" are useful in developing a contemporary analysis of this ele-
ment of proof under both the current asylum and withholding
provisions.
In Kovac v. INS, a 1969 Ninth Circuit case, the court defined the
term "persecution" as follows: "No doubt 'persecution' is too strong
a word to be satisfied by proof of the likelihood of minor disadvan-
tage or trivial inconvenience . . . . [T] he word 'persecution' ordina-
rily conveys the infliction of suffering or harm upon those who differ
.. . in a way regarded as offensive."10 7 Although the Kovac defini-
tion provides limited guidance as to the exact meaning of the word
"persecution," it continues to be the most often cited authority on
the term's meaning.108
In one recent case, Hernandez-Ortiz v. INS, the court undertook
the difficult task of refining the Kovac definition and determining in
what circumstances threats or violence constitute "political persecu-
tion." 109 In that case, the court suggested the following framework
for determining when persecution occurs:
Persecution occurs only when there is a difference between the persecutor's
view or status and that of the victim; it is oppression which is inflicted on
groups or individuals because of a difference that the persecutor will not
tolerate [citations omitted]. For this reason, in determining whether threats
or violence constitute political persecution, it is permissible to examine the
motivation of the persecutor.1 "
Other recent cases have refined the Kovac definition by negative
example. The court consistently has stated that the persecution ele-
105. But see Espinosa-Martinez v. INS, 754 F.2d 1536, 1540 (9th Cir. 1985)
(Fergusen, J., dissenting) ("[tihe major premise [of the majority opinion] misstates the
law. Section 243(h) does not state that the threat to freedom must be severe. The words
are 'freedom would be threatened' ").
106. Judicial authority prior to Stevic tended to merge the two terms. See, e.g.,
McMullen v. INS, 658 F.2d 1312, 1315 (9th Cir. 1981) ("likelihood of persecution, i.e.,
a threat to life or freedom").
107. 407 F.2d 102, 107 (9th Cir. 1969) (citation omitted).
108. See, e.g., Hernandez-Ortiz v. INS, 777 F.2d 509, 516 (9th Cir. 1985); Car-
doza-Fonseca, 767 F.2d at 1452; Sagermark v. INS, 767 F.2d 645, 649-50 (9th Cir.
1985); Artukovic v. INS, 639 F.2d 894, 897 (9th Cir. 1982) (term "persecution" is not
unconstitutionally vague [citing Kovac]); Moghanian v. United States Dept. of Just., 577
F.2d 141, 142 (9th Cir. 1978) ("the . . . lenient definition of 'persecution' found in
Kovac"); In re Dunar, 14 I.& N. Dec. 310, 320 (BIA 1973).
109. 777 F.2d 509, 516 (9th Cir. 1985).
110. Id.
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ment cannot be established by allegations of widespread violence, an-
archy, or unrest which equally affect all citizens of the applicant's
homeland."a The court also rejected as satisfying the persecution el-
ement of proof claims of generalized economic disadvantage,11 2 de-
cline in the political fortunes of the applicant's family, 1 a or loss of
the applicant's family land due to a land reform program.1 4
The court also has ruled that an order confining the applicant to
quarters by his superiors in the Nicaraguan Army is not an example
of past persecution but instead a "relatively mild punishment."115 In
addition, incidents in which the applicant was detained by govern-
ment security forces for an identification check are not, standing
alone, sufficient to demonstrate persecution. 16
Prosecution v. Persecution
An applicant who alleges that his prosecution for a variety of
criminal offenses is a guise for persecution must demonstrate that
11I. Maroufi v. INS, 772 F.2d 597, 599 (9th Cir. 1985); Lopez v. INS, 775 F.2d
1015, 1017 (9th Cir. 1985); Zepeda-Melendez v. INS, 741 F.2d 285, 290 (9th Cir.
1984); Lopez-Chavez v. INS, 723 F.2d 1431, 1434 (9th Cir. 1984); Martinez-Romero v.
INS, 692 F.2d 595, 595-96 (9th Cir. 1982); see also Flores-Ponce v. INS, No. 83-7742
(9th Cir. July 10, 1985); Sanchez-Reyes v. INS, No. 83-7977 (9th Cir. Jan. 21, 1985);
Palacios-Castro v. INS, No. 83-7275 (9th Cir. Oct. 1, 1984). But cf Bolanos-Hernandez
v. INS, 767 F.2d 1277, 1284 (9th Cir. 1985) (evaluation of the significance of a specific
threat to an individual's life and freedom will not be lessened by the fact that the individ-
ual resides in a country where the lives and freedom of a large number of persons are
threatened). See also Pino-Valencia v. INS, No. 83-7036, slip op. at 3 (9th Cir. July 26,
1984). The court commented in this unpublished opinion:
Pino-Valencia's evidence presents the all too familiar picture of a turbulent
and dangerous local situation in which his country's government is unwilling or
unable to protect the safety and human rights of the inhabitants of much of its
territory. Pino-Valencia presents the understandable desire of a young, vulnera-
ble person in a tragically unsafe country to emigrate to a country that offers a
safer and better life .... However, the requirement of proof is a reasonable,
indeed essential, element of satisfying the statute's purpose of according asy-
lum to those who would suffer persecution.
Id.
112. Raass v. INS, 692 F.2d 596 (9th Cir. 1982). Cf. Kovac v. INS, 407 F.2d 102,
107 (9th Cir. 1969) (under the § 243(h) amendments of 1965, deliberate imposition of
substantial economic disadvantage is required).
113. Shoaee v. INS, 704 F.2d 1079, 1084 (9th Cir. 1983).
114. Figueroa-Polio v. INS, No. 84-7240, slip op. at 3 (9th Cir. Aug. 30, 1985).
115. Espinosa-Martinez v. INS, 754 F.2d 1536, 1540 (9th Cir. 1985).
116. Figueroa-Polio, No. 84-7240, slip op. at 3; accord Ramirez v. INS, No. 84-
7500, slip op. at 3 (9th Cir. Aug. 20, 1985) ("[a]lthough he was stopped and questioned
on occasion by the National Guard, he admits he was never imprisoned or mistreated,
and his testimony suggests that these were nothing more than routine stops for
identification").
the consequences he faces on return are political in nature. 117
On several occasions, the court has ruled that prosecution for mili-
tary desertion does not constitute "the type of persecution that we
are concerned with in [withholding of deportation] proceedings. '"1 8
For example, in Castro-Magana v. INS, where the applicant alleged
that the Salvadoran army kills deserters, such as himself, he had to
provide proof that the killings occur and that this punishment is po-
litically motivated.119 Similarly, punishment for a crime or for a
breach of contract is not sufficient for section 243(h) purposes unless
the applicant can demonstrate a discriminatory application of the pe-
nal law in his home country 1 20
In one unpublished opinion, however, the court endorsed the Fifth
Circuit ruling in Coriolan v. INS'21 that "prosecution for the offense
of illegal departure can amount to persecution" if the alien can sub-
stantiate that the government of his country "carried out a policy of
persecuting those who have illegally fled the country. 1 122
Agents of Persecution
In McMullen v. INS, the Ninth Circuit's description of the ele-
ments necessary for withholding of deportation includes the likeli-
hood of persecution "by the government or by a group which the
government is unable to control.12 3 In addition, an asylum or with-
holding of deportation applicant can allege that he fears persecution
by both the government and forces the government cannot control,
such as guerrillas. 24 In Cruz-Castanaza v. INS, however, where the
petitioner alleged that he had received death threats on the tele-
phone but did not specify whom he suspected of placing the calls, he
117. Kovac, 407 F.2d at 104 (asylum may be granted if applicant who deserted
ship would afterward be punished for violating a politically motivated prohibition against
defection from a police state); In re Janus and Janek, 12 I.& N. Dec. 866, 875 (BIA
1968) (applicant's illegal departure resulted in convictions for defection; constituted per-
secution for political offenses, not punishment for violation of criminal statute).
118. Espinosa-Martinez, 754 F.2d at 1540; accord Shah v. INS, No. 82-7341 (9th
Cir. Sept. 10, 1984); Hussain v. INS, No. 82-7104 (9th Cir. Apr. 29, 1983); Afzal v.
INS, No. 80-7180 (9th Cir. Sept. 2, 1981).
119. Castro-Magana v. INS, No. 83-7378, slip op. at 6. But cf. Saballo-Cortez v.
INS, 749 F.2d 1354 (9th Cir.), as amended, 761 F.2d 1259, 1270 (9th Cir. 1984)
(Pregerson, J., dissenting) ("[e]ven if one characterizes Saballo-Cortez as a Nicaraguan
army evader, it is hard to imagine how repeated threats, including a threat of being
found dead in a field with one's eyes filled with ants, could ever 'be interpreted as legiti-
mate legal sanctions' ").
120. Hafeez v. INS, No. 81-7453, slip op. at 4 (9th Cir. Dec. 1, 1982).
121. 559 F.2d 993, 1000 (5th Cir. 1977).
122. Lopez-Canas v. INS, No. 83-7849, slip op. at 3 (9th Cir. Dec. 5, 1984). Cf.
Castro-Magana v. INS, No. 83-7378, slip op. at 2-3 (9th Cir. Sept. 25, 1984).
123. 658 F.2d at 1315; accord Bolanos-Hernandez v. INS, 767 F.2d 1277, 1284
(9th Cir. 1985); Zepeda-Melendez v. INS, 741 F.2d 285, 289 (9th Cir. 1984).
124. Sarvia-Quintanilla v. INS, 767 F.2d 1387, 1390, 1399 (9th Cir. 1985);
Zepeda-Melendez, 741 F.2d at 287, 289.
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failed to satisfy the McMullen requirement of showing that the call-
ers were either government officials or members of a group the-gov-
ernment is unable or unwilling to control.125
The applicant for asylum or withholding of deportation must also
demonstrate that the potential persecutors have the capacity, ability,
and will to carry out the acts of persecution.1 26 In Bolanos-Her-
nandez, the petitioner alleged that guerrillas had threatened him
before his departure from his native El Salvador. The court recog-
nized the seriousness of that threat by reference to two sources of
information. First, the court evaluated general documentary evi-
dence, such as newspaper accounts which "note[d] ...the execu-
tions conducted in retaliation for refusals (like petitioner's) to join
political guerilla groups. 1 27 Second, it credited the petitioner's testi-
mony regarding the assassination of five of his friends because of
their refusal to join the guerrillas, and the allegation that his brother
may also have been killed by the same group. 12
8
Similarly, in Argueta v. INS, the petitioner alleged he had re-
ceived threats from a rightist group known as the "Squadron of
Death."1 29 The applicant's statement regarding the torture-killing of
his close friend by the same group substantiated the likelihood of the
persecutors carrying out their threats against him.1 30
Summary
The pre-Refugee Act case, Kovac v. INS, contains the Ninth Cir-
cuit's most enduring commentary on the term persecution, defining it
as "the infliction of suffering or harm upon those who differ. . . in a
125. Cruz-Castanaza v. INS, No. 84-7040, slip op. at 2-3 (9th Cir. June 27,
1985); accord Rosales-Perez v. INS, No. 83-7278, slip op. at 2 (9th Cir. Oct. 8, 1985)
(petitioner feared persecution because of murder of friends, but had no idea who commit-
ted the murders); Estrada v. INS, 775 F.2d 1019, 1021 (9th Cir. 1985) (applicant could
not identify any of the "private groups" he purportedly feared); Ramirez v. INS, No. 84-
7500, slip op. at 3 (9th Cir. Aug. 22, 1985) (applicant could not identify who shot him in
the leg in 1977).
126. Bolanos-Hernandez, 767 F.2d at 1285-86; accord Del Valle v. INS, 776 F.2d
1407 (9th Cir. 1985) (petitioner provided adequate documentation that a threat of perse-
cution from "security forces" in El Salvador is to be taken seriously); Sarvia-
Quintanilla, 767 F.2d at 1394 ("none of [the petitioner's] supporting evidence directly
supports the contention that the F.R.S. [the guerilla organization which the applicant
feared would persecute him] is inclined or able to persecute those who disagree with their
objectives or strategies").
127. Bolanos-Hernandez, 767 F.2d at 1286.
128. Id.
129. 759 F.2d 1395, 1396 (9th Cir. 1985).
130. Id. at 1397 n.3.
way regarded as offensive."' 31 In Hernandez-Ortiz v. INS, the court
added a new gloss to Kovac by ruling that the motivation of the
persecutor is relevant in determining whether threats and violence
constitute political persecution. 132 The Ninth Circuit also has ruled
that the following situations do not constitute persecution: wide-
spread violence, anarchy and unrest equally affecting all citizens, or
economic disadvantage or decline. 3 Additionally, prosecution for a
criminal offense will ordinarily not be considered persecution unless
the applicant can demonstrate that the punishment he faces is politi-
cally motivated. But an application for withholding of deportation or
asylum can allege that the feared persecution may occur at the
hands of the government or groups which the government cannot
control. 34
Bases: Race, Religion, Nationality, Membership in a Particular
Social Group, or Political Opinion
The Refugee Act limits the availability of the protections of asy-
lum and withholding of deportation to persons who can demonstrate
that their fear of persecution or threat to life or freedom is based on
one of five factors: race, religion, nationality, membership in a par-
ticular social group, or political opinion. 35
Political Opinion
The most commonly invoked basis for asylum and withholding of
deportation requests has been political opinion. In analyzing the "po-
litical opinion" basis, the court most often has examined indicia
commonly associated with an overt manifestation of political opinion.
For example, in Zavala-Bonilla v. INS, the court reversed the BIA
ruling as it found credible the applicant's statements regarding her
active political participation in a trade union in her native El Salva-
dor.' 36 The applicant was an executive official in the union and had
participated in strike activities in which she was personally con-
fronted and harassed by state police.137
In Canjura-Flores v. INS, the court reversed the BIA's denial of
asylum and withholding of deportation where the applicant in uncon-
troverted testimony stated that he was an active member of a leftist
organization, participated in public meetings and protest marches
131. See supra text accompanying notes 107-08.
132. See supra text accompanying notes 109-10.
133. See supra text accompanying notes 111-14.
134. See supra text accompanying notes 123-24.
135. See supra note 15 and text accompanying note 26.
136. 730 F.2d 562, 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1984).
137. Id. at 563, 565.
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and distributed propaganda and painted slogans.13 8 In the recent un-
published case, Cruz-Canales v. INS, the court remanded to the
Board for reconsideration where uncontested evidence existed that
the petitioner had publicly broadcast his political views in a televi-
sion interview by stating that the Salvadoran government was re-
sponsible for the killing of a prominent Salvadoran priest and expres-
sing his belief that rich people exploit the poor.139
Where advocacy, membership in organizations, and other typical
indicators of political opinion are absent, the Ninth Circuit, until
very recently, generally rejected the appeal. For example, in
Saballo-Cortez v. INS, the court upheld the immigration judge and
BIA findings that "there was no evidence that Saballo-Cortez be-
longed to any political organization or had taken any political opin-
ion."140 Similarly, in three recent unpublished opinions, the BIA's
denial of relief was affirmed, in part because of the applicant's lack
of a demonstrated political opinion. In one case, the applicant testi-
fied "that he never belonged to any political group or expressed anti-
government views while in El Salvador."' 41 In another, the panel
pointed out that the applicant "did not list membership in any or-
ganization in his asylum application," nor was there evidence that he
was "politically active. 14 2 In the third case, the court noted that the
applicant "had never belonged to any political organizations, had
never publicly expressed opposition to the Nicaraguan government
and had never been arrested in Nicaragua."'1 43 Even where an appli-
138. No. 83-7890, slip op. at 6 (9th Cir. Sept. 24, 1985). Cf. Garcia-Ramos v.
INS, 775 F.2d 1370 (9th Cir. 1985) (participation in political organization's activities,
such as distributing propaganda, painting slogans and participating in demonstrations,
sufficient for asylum eligibility if testimony is believable; remanded for credibility find-
ings); Samimi v. INS, 714 F.2d 992, 995 (9th Cir. 1983) (applicant's outspoken opposi-
tion to Khomeini government a key factor in court's decision to reopen his case for hear-
ing on the applications for asylum and withholding of deportation).
139. No. 84-7075, slip op. at 2 (9th Cir. Nov. 21, 1985).
140. 761 F.2d 1259, 1264 (9th Cir. 1984). Judge Pregerson's lengthy dissent spe-
cifically took issue with the majority on this point. After reviewing the transcript, he
stated that "[Saballo-Cortez'] refusals to join the militia or the Sandinista Committee
were based on his political opinion . . .[and] other statements by Saballo-Cortez at the
hearing indicate that his problems with Nicaraguan authorities stemmed from his re-
fusal, for political reasons, to support the Sandinista effort." Id. at 1268-69 (Pregerson,
J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
141. Figueroa-Polio v. INS, No. 84-7240, slip op. at 3 (9th Cir. Aug. 30, 1985).
142. Solano-Martinez v. INS, No. 83-7320, slip op. at 2 (9th Cir. Aug. 29, 1985).
143. Lanuza-Rosalez v. INS, No. 84-7414, slip op. at 2 (9th Cir. July 10, 1985);
see also Rosales-Perez v. INS, No. 83-7278, slip op. at 2 (9th Cir. Oct. 8, 1985)
("[tihere is no indication whatsoever that Rosales-Perez or any member of his family
have ever been politically involved or implicated in any way"); Turcios v. INS, No. 83-
7802, slip op. at 2 (9th Cir. Sept. 4, 1984) ("although threats had been made against
cant claimed that he attended and spoke at public meetings, a panel
of the court, in an unpublished ruling, required that he be more spe-
cific and offer evidence that would tend to show that the government
was aware of his activities.1 44
Where the alleged danger the petitioner faces does not result from
his political opinion, the court has ruled that he will not be eligible
for either asylum or withholding of deportation protection. For ex-
ample, in Espinosa-Martinez v. INS, the petitioner's allegation of
confinement to quarters was not supported by any evidence that this
action occurred "due to his political opinion." ' In Chavez v. INS,
the petitioner alleged that his former employment as a security
guard and his ownership of a gun would subject him to possible per-
secution in El Salvador; however, the court ruled that these facts did
not form a basis for protection within the meaning of the Refugee
Act. 46 In a recent unpublished case, the petitioner testified that he
operated an after-hours gambling establishment and was paying
bribes to local police.1 47 When he told the local police commander
that he might not be able to pay his usual amount, the court found
that "the death threat he received stemmed from his gambling activ-
ities and was not connected to his political opinions. 14 8
In Bolanos-Hernandez, however, Judge Reinhardt's opinion stated
an important distinction from this more traditional line of think-
ing.148 In Bolanos-Hernandez, the petitioner had consciously refused
to join either the guerrillas or the army in El Salvador and had sev-
ered his past ties with a right-wing organization because of his wish
"to remain neutral.' 150 The court rejected the government's conten-
tion that neutrality is never political and ruled that "[c]hoosing to
remain neutral is no less a political decision than is choosing to affili-
ate with a particular political faction . . . .When a person is aware
[the petitioners] because they were in the business of selling medicine to the government
and the guerrillas, [they] conceded that they did not belong to any political or social
group for which they would suffer persecution").
144. Ramirez v. INS, No. 84-7500, slip op. at 3 (9th Cir. Aug. 20, 1985).
145. 754 F.2d 1536, 1540 (9th Cir. 1985).
146. Chavez v. INS, 723 F.2d 1431, 1433 (9th Cir. 1984). Cf. Rodriguez-Agustin
v. INS, 765 F.2d 782, 783 (9th Cir. 1985) (fear of persecution because of lack of official
documentation does not fall within the meaning of the bases under § 208 or § 243(h));
Zepeda-Melendez v. INS, 741 F.2d 285, 287, 290 (9th Cir. 1984) (fear of persecution
because of the strategic location of the applicant's family home, making it desirable to
both guerrillas and the government does not fall within any of the bases enumerated in §
208 or § 243(h)); see also Guerra-Magana v. INS, No. 82-7044, slip op. at 2 (9th Cir.
Nov. 19, 1982) (petitioner alleged that he had been shot at by "communist guerrillas"
but "it does not appear that the alleged attacks were provoked by religious or even politi-
cal differences").
147. Sorto-Castro v. INS, No. 83-7690 (9th Cir. Sept. 4, 1985).
148. Id. at 2-3.
149. 767 F.2d 1277 (9th Cir. 1985).
150. Id. at 1286.
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of contending political forces and affirmatively chooses not to join
any faction, that choice is a political one." 151 In addition, the court
unequivocally rejected the government's argument that the "motives
of the individual who chooses neutrality must be examined by the
court. 15 2 The court ruled that Bolanos-Hernandez's act of refusing
to join either faction is considered an affirmative expression of his
political opinion as much as "joining [either] side or speaking for or
against [either] side".'53
In Argueta v. INS, a different panel of the court, with one dissent,
endorsed and by implication extended the Bolanos-Hernandez rul-
ing. In that case, applicant Argueta (unlike Bolanos-Hernandez)
never overtly manifested his refusal to join either the guerrillas or
the government while in El Salvador. 54 Rather, Argueta merely
stated at his hearing his "lack of agreement with, support for, or
help to either side."' 5 Judge Hug ruled that Argueta's testimony did
establish his political opinion. 15
In Del Valle v. INS, the court further expanded the Bolanos-Her-
151. Id. (emphasis in original). The court analogizes the political nature of a
choice of neutrality to a "nation's decision to remain neutral"(citing the Neutrality Act
of 1939, 22 U.S.C. §§ 441-465 (1982)). Id.
152. The court ruled that:
First, it is simply improper for the government to inquire into the motives un-
derlying an individual's political decisions. Second, the motives . . .will be
both complex and difficult to ascertain .... Third ... it is irrelevant why the
individual made his choice. It does not matter to the persecutors what the indi-
vidual's motivation is. The guerrillas in El Salvador do not inquire into the
reasoning process of those who insist on remaining neutral and refuse to join
their cause. They are concerned only with an act that constitutes an overt man-
ifestation of a political opinion. Persecution because of that overt manifestation
is persecution because of a political opinion.
Id. at 1287 (footnote omitted).
In note 18, the court states that it is not deciding "whether a failure to join any side,
absent a conscious choice, represents a political decision ... nor need we decide here
whether a failure to join a particular side, absent more, constitutes the expression of a
political opinion." Id. n.18 (emphasis in original).
153. Id. at 1287 (citations omitted). Cf. Lopez v. INS, 775 F.2d 1015 (9th Cir.
1985) (applicant did not make affirmative choice of political neutrality; testimony indi-
cated he was apathetic and had, no opinion on how his native El Salvador should be
governed).
154. 759 F.2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1985).
155. Id. at 1397 n.3.
156. He further stated:
It is apparent the [immigration judge] erroneously assumed that it was neces-
sary for Argueta to prove his allegiance to a particular political faction.
Argueta's testimony indicated that he had affirmatively chosen to remain polit-
ically neutral. We therefore conclude that Argueta's decision to remain neutral
constituted an expression of political opinion.
Id. at 1397.
nandez ruling by holding that an applicant's refusal to join a partic-
ular side could constitute an expression of political opinion. 157 In
that case, the applicant was approached for recruitment on several
occasions by the Squadron of Death in El Salvador. 158 His refusal to
join, coupled with his continued pursuit of his studies and his work
in a community sports project, constituted specific evidence of his
neutral convictions.' 59 The court held: "Del Valle has . . made a
considered choice to take a neutral stance [citing Bolanos] and,
based upon his past persecution, is likely to be persecuted for main-
taining his political neutrality if he returns. '1 0
The views expressed in Bolanos-Hernandez and its progeny re-
garding political neutrality as an expression of political conscience
carve out an important exception to the long-entrenched view that
only overt acts of political expression constitute "political opinion"
within the meaning of refugee protection provisions."' Moreover, in
Hernandez-Ortiz v. INS, the court specifically rejected a universal
requirement of direct political expression or participation by the ap-
plicant, be it neutrality or affirmative advocacy, to establish eligibil-
ity for withholding of deportation or asylum on the basis of political
opinion. 62 Instead, Judge Reinhardt's opinion emphasized the per-
ception of the government (or other persecuting agent), not the acts
or views of the applicant, as the key factor in determining whether
persecution on the basis of political opinion is likely. The court
explained:
A government does not under ordinary circumstances engage in political
persecution of those who share its ideology, only those whose views or phi-
losophies differ, at least in the government's perception. It is irrelevant
whether a victim's political view is neutrality, as in Bolanos-Hernandez, or
disapproval of the acts or opinions of the government. Moreover it is irrele-
vant whether a victim actually possesses any of these opinions as long as the
government believes that he does (citation omitted) .... When . . .an
alien establishes a prima facie case that he is likely to be persecuted be-
cause of the government's belief about his views or loyalties, his actual po-
litical conduct, be it silence or affirmative advocacy, and his actual political
views, be they neutrality or partisanship, are irrelevant; whatever the cir-
cumstances, the persecution is properly categorized as being "on account of
...political opinion." 163
The court's decision recognizes that in most countries, a failure to
act or express political views will not ordinarily "trigger retribu-
157. Del Valle v. INS, 776 F.2d 1407, 1414 (9th Cir. 1985).
158. Id. at 1409.
159. Id. at 1413-14.
160. Id. at 1414.
161. Compare text accompanying notes 149-60 with text accompanying notes 136-
48.
162. 777 F.2d 509 (9th Cir. 1985).
163. Id. at 517.
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tion. ' ' 164 But where a government acts against an individual or mem-
bers of a group and there is no legitimate basis for that action, the
court will apply a presumption that the government's action was po-
litically motivated. 115 By so ruling, the court deliberately rejects a
restrictive or mechanistic construction of the term "political
opinion."1616
Group Bases
Each of the remaining four factors for asylum and withholding of
deportation protection are based on the applicant's membership in a
group, be it a racial, religious, national, or social group. The crux of
the applicant's claim is that other members of the group have exper-
ienced persecution and, therefore, as a member of that same group,
he or she has a reasonable fear of persecution.167
The United Nations High Commissioner on Refugees (Handbook)
expresses the view that "mere membership" in a racial, religious,
community, or particular social group "will not normally be enough
to substantiate a claim to refugee status."168 The Handbook adds,
however, that "there may be situations where, due to special circum-
stances, such membership will in itself be sufficient ground to fear
persecution." 169
At the present time, the Ninth Circuit decisions provide little in-
formation regarding its view of the group bases for protection under
164. The court cites with approval HANDBOOK, supra note 63, 1 80-83 for the
principle that the government's persecution of persons to whom it attributes certain polit-
ical opinions is persecution on account of political opinion.
165. Id. at 516.
166. Id.
167. See, e.g., Figueroa-Polio v. INS, No. 84-7240, slip op. at 4 (9th Cir. Aug. 30,
1985) (persecution claim based on status as Catholic and a young adult male; the court
held that the record failed to show persecution of either group, as a group, in El Salva-
dor); Aziz v. INS, No. 84-7536, slip op. at 3 (9th Cir. Aug. 16, 1985) (an arrest nine
years earlier for refusal to join the Ba'ath political party was not evidence of persecution
for religious beliefs); Ahmed v. INS, No. 83-7173, slip op. at 2 (9th Cir. Dec. 7, 1983)
(the applicant could provide "no specific example of similarly situated persons [i.e., Mus-
lims who convert to Christianity] in [his native] Pakistan [suffering persecution]").
168. HANDBOOK, supra note 63, %% 70, 73, 79.
169. Id. 1 73, 79. Cf. Ananch-Firempong v. INS, 766 F.2d 621, 626 (Ist Cir.
1985), which cited with approval the Handbook's definition of a social group as:
"persons of similar background, habits or social status . . . membership of
[sic] such a particular social group may be at the root of persecution because
there is no confidence in the group's loyalty to the Government or because the
political outlook, antecedents or economic activity of its members, or the very
existence of the social group as such, is held to be an obstacle to the Govern-
ment's policies." (emphasis in original).
HANDBOOK, supra note 63, U 77-78.
the Refugee Act. For example, in the few cases where membership
in the particular social group "young urban males" from El Salvador
has been raised, little or no evidence was introduced to document the
persecution of members of that social group.170 Accordingly, the
court rejected the petitioners' claims without stating its views on the
nature and scope of the social group basis for asylum or withholding
of deportation protections. 17 1
In Martinez-Romero v. INS, the BIA ruling implied that had the
applicant established that students in El Salvador were being perse-
cuted, her motion to reopen to apply for asylum and withholding of
deportation based on her membership in the social group of students
might have been granted.17 2 On review, the court's two-paragraph
opinion made no mention of the group basis for fearing persecu-
tion.173 The court's ruling required the petitioner to demonstrate
"special circumstances" before relief under section 208 or section
243(h) could be granted, but the court did not state what circum-
stances or conditions would satisfy that requirement.17 4 Subsequent
cases which cite with approval the "special circumstances" language
also provide no insight into what the court means by that phrase. 7 5
170. Lopez-Chavez v. INS, 723 F.2d 1431, 1434 (9th Cir. 1984); Figueroa-Polio,
No. 84-7240, slip op. at 4; Sanchez-Reyes v. INS, No. 83-7977, slip op. at 2 (9th Cir.
Jan. 21, 1985); Lopez-Canas v. INS, No. 83-7849, slip op. at 2-3 (9th Cir. Dec. 15,
1984). See also Cruz-Castanaza v. INS, No. 84-7040, slip op. at 3 (9th Cir. June 27,
1985) (membership in a group of young professionals not sufficient where there is "no
suggestion that the leftists or the government actively persecute members of this social
class").
171. Lopez-Chavez, 723 F.2d at 1434. But cf. Canjura-Flores v. INS, No. 83-
7890, slip op. at 6 (9th Cir. Sept. 24, 1985) ("[t]he Board's findings that it was unlikely
that the government would seek out Canjura-Flores because of his youth ... conflict
with the evidence," including the petitioner's uncontroverted statement and an Amnesty
International report).
172. In re Martinez-Romero, 18 I. & N. Dec. 75, 79 (BIA 1982). In In re Acosta-
Solarzano, Interim Dec. 2986 (BIA March 1, 1985), the Board elaborated on its inter-
pretation of the term "persecution on account of membership in a particular social
group." According to the Board that term means:
persecution that is directed toward an individual who is a member of a group
of persons all of whom share a common, immutable characteristic. The shared
characteristic might be an innate one such as sex, color or kinship ties, in some
circumstances it might be a shared past experience, such as former military
leadership or land ownership .... [W]hatever the common characteristic that
defines the group, it must be one that members of the group either cannot
change, or should not be required to change because it is fundamental to their
individual identities or consciences.
Id. at 24.
173. Martinez-Romero v. INS, 692 F.2d 595 (9th Cir. 1982).
174. Id. at 595-96. The use of the "special circumstances" language in this deci-
sion is especially puzzling since the court makes no mention of the UNHCR Handbook
provisions from which the phrase derives. See supra note 63.
175. See, e.g., Zepeda-Melendez v. INS, 741 F.2d 285, 290 (9th Cir. 1984); Cha-
vez v. INS, 723 F.2d 1431, 1434 (9th Cir. 1984). See also Dally v. INS, 744 F.2d 1191,
1196 (6th Cir. 1984). But see generally Helton, Persecution on Account of Membership
in a Social Group as a Basis for Refugee Status, 15 COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REv. 39
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In another case premised in part on the applicant's group affiliation,
Maroufi v. INS, the court rejected a motion to reopen to apply for
asylum and withholding of deportation where the only evidence sup-
porting the applicant's persecution claim which was based on his
support for the Mujahadeen, an opposition group in Iran, was his
own conclusory statement that members of that group were being
executed en masse. 17 6
In two recent cases, however, the court has ruled that evidence of
persecution of members of applicant's family can form a basis for
applications for asylum and withholding of deportation.'" For exam-
ple, in Hernandez-Ortiz v. INS, the court contrasted the applicant's
evidence to that offered in Maroufi and ruled that "Hernandez-Or-
tiz, in contrast, has described numerous specific incidents in which
members of her family-a small, readily identifiable group-have
been the victims of threats and acts of violence. Her knowledge de-
rives from her own communications with her family.' 7 In a signifi-
cant footnote, the court further clarified its position regarding group-
based applications for asylum or withholding of deportation:
We did not intend to suggest in Maroufi that membership in a persecuted
group is insufficient in itself to require a finding of eligibility for asylum or
an order prohibiting deportation. Such a suggestion would squarely contra-
dict history. Few could doubt, for example, that any Jew fleeing Nazi Ger-
many in the 1930's or 40's would by virtue of his or her religious status
alone have established a clear probability of persecution.17
In Del Valle v. INS, the court stated that "there must be some
evidence that the applicant or those similarly-situated are at a
greater risk than the general population."' 80 In that case, the appli-
cant testified to the assassination of a cousin and the disappearance
of a nephew. The testimony was corroborated by the testimony of
the cousin's mother and by newspaper clippings and letters from El
Salvador.'"' The court ruled that the evidence suggested that his
family was particularly affected by conditions in their home country
and helped to support his claim for asylum.8 2
The court has not ruled that membership in a persecuted family
(1983).
176. 772 F.2d 597, 599 (9th Cir. 1985).
177. Hernandez-Ortiz v. INS, 777 F.2d 509 (9th Cir. 1985); Del Valle v. INS,
776 F.2d 1407 (9th Cir. 1985).
178. 777 F.2d 509, 516 (9th Cir. 1985).
179. Id. at 515-16 n.6 (citations omitted).
180. 776 F.2d 1407, 1411 (1985).
181. Id. at 1409-10.
182. Id. at 1413.
constitutes membership in a particular social group for purposes of
the applicable Refugee Act provision. Nonetheless, these two deci-
sions indicate the court's readiness to equate evidence of persecution
of family members with evidence of persecution of persons in "simi-
lar situations," the cornerstone of proof in any group-based applica-
tion for asylum or withholding of deportation.
Summary
The Ninth Circuit decisions, until very recently, analyzed the "po-
litical opinion" basis for asylum or withholding of deportation pro-
tection with reference to typical manifestations of political views
such as trade union activism, participation in political organizations,
participation in demonstrations and meetings, the making of
speeches or broadcasts of one's views. The absence of such activity or
the lack of connection between the applicant's described activity and
any political viewpoint or group often doomed the applicant's appeal.
Four recent cases analyzing the claims of Salvadoran refugees rec-
ognize, however, that a hard and fast rule regarding overt political
activity as required for political opinion-based applications is no
longer universally appropriate.1 83 For example, the traditional rule is
inapplicable in situations where an applicant's neutrality is taken as
a manifestation of political opinion by the potential persecutor or
where the government perceives that the applicant holds oppositional
views, even without overt act or affiliation on the part of the appli-
cant. The court ruled that an applicant who consciously refused to
join either the guerrillas or the army because he wished to remain
neutral had made a political choice which constituted an overt mani-
festation of political opinion.18 4 Additionally, the applicant's testify-
ing as to his desire to remain neutral was ruled an expression of his
political opinion' 85 and the applicant's refusal to be recruited by the
death squads in El Salvador also was held to be a manifestation of
his political opinion.118 Lastly, the court recognized that the govern-
ment's perception of the applicant's political opinion is critical to an
analysis of the application for asylum and withholding of deportation
based on political opinion.187
The Ninth Circuit has yet to review or discuss, to any significant
extent, applications for asylum or withholding of deportation pre-
183. See supra text accompanying notes 149-66.
184. See supra text accompanying notes 149-53.
185. See supra text accompanying notes 154-56.
186. See supra text accompanying notes 157-60.
187. Hernandez-Ortiz, 777 F.2d at 516-17. The court ruled that the government's
belief that an applicant holds oppositional views renders irrelevant his or her actual polit-
ical views. Further, the government must be presumed to be politically motivated where
it acts against individuals or groups without a legitimate basis.
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mised on any of the group bases in the Refugee Act provisions. The
few cases squarely raising group-based claims apparently did not
provide sufficient evidence to warrant extensive discussion of the
claim.
IMPLICATIONS OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT CASES: DOCUMENTATION
AND EVIDENTIARY ISSUES
Introduction
The challenge raised by the discussion in the previous section of
this Article is to translate an understanding of each of the elements
of the asylum and withholding of deportation provisions into con-
crete evidentiary requirements. In this section, the Article will con-
sider the nature, quality, and quantity of proof required to meet the
burdens of proof for asylum and withholding of deportation.
The central issues in the documenting of requests for asylum and
withholding of deportation fall under two major rubrics: those con-
cerned with the applicant's own statement and those concerned with
other forms of evidence. This Article will examine the kinds of docu-
mentation the Ninth Circuit has found useful in its analysis of spe-
cific cases. Further, the Article will discuss whether the applicant is
always required to corroborate his own statement through extrinsic
evidence. Lastly, the Article will explore the specific factors that the
Ninth Circuit has used in assessing the credibility of the applicant.
Nontestimonial Evidence
General Documentary Evidence
The Ninth Circuit has held that "general information concerning
the oppressive conditions [in the applicant's home country] is rele-
vant to support specific information relating to an individual's well-
founded fear of persecution." 188 That position is a clear rejection of
the oft-expressed view of the BIA and some other courts that news-
paper articles, human rights reports, and similar documents are not
significantly probative on the issue of whether a particular individual
would be subject to persecution if deported. 89
188. Zavala-Bonilla v. INS, 730 F.2d 562, 564 (9th Cir. 1984). Cf. Nunez-Alfaro
v. INS, No. 83-7208, slip op. at 2-3 (9th Cir. Sept. 19, 1985) ("general evidence is
insufficient unless the individual can also offer specific evidence that he would himself be
singled out for persecution").
189. See, e.g., Daily v. INS, 744 F.2d 1191, 1196-97 (6th Cir. 1984) (a newspaper
article which contained detailed information regarding the harassment of United States
In Bolanos-Hernandez, the court noted that newspaper articles
concerning the human rights situation in El Salvador were useful in
its task of determining whether Bolanos had a legitimate fear of per-
secution based on threats directed to him.190 Similarly, in Zavala-
Bonilla v. INS, where the asylum applicant was a union member,
the court ruled that the BIA committed error when it disregarded
general accounts of an increase in attacks on unions and heightened
persecution of union members."9' In Samimi v. INS, newspaper arti-
cles describing mass executions of political opponents of the regime
in Iran were acknowledged to be a key factor in the reopening of the
petitioner's case.192
In Chatila v. INS, however, the court rejected newspaper accounts
that discussed general problems of terrorism and crime in Venezuela
because they failed to provide "any evidence even remotely relevant
to the question whether Mr. Chatila would be persecuted upon his
return to Venezuela.' 9 3 In a recent unpublished decision, the appli-
cant's attorney did not submit to the immigration judge any of the
available documentary evidence regarding the treatment of Guate-
malan Indians such as the petitioner.' The court ruled that the at-
torney's actions did not constitute reversible error, since general doc-
umentary evidence is insufficient to satisfy the applicant's burden of
proof "in the absence of specific evidence from which it can be in-
ferred that the applicant would be persecuted." 95
Summary
The court has manifested its willingness to consider documents
describing the general human rights situation and level of repression
immigrants of Iraqi origin such as the petitioner, who were critical of the Iraqi religious
party, was rejected since it did not refer specifically to the petitioner); In re Martinez-
Romero, 18 I. & N. Dec. 75, 79 (1982).
190. 767 F.2d 1277, 1285-86 (9th Cir. 1985). The court stated:
The newspaper articles introduced by Bolanos note the violent retribution that
may follow the expression of political views in El Salvador and the executions
conducted in retaliation for refusals to join political guerrilla groups. This gen-
eral documentary evidence supports Bolanos' contention that he would suffer
political persecution if returned to El Salvador.
Id. at 1286.
191. 730 F.2d at 565.
192. 714 F.2d 992, 995 (9th Cir. 1983); accord Hernandez-Ortiz, 777 F.2d at 509.
On a motion to reopen, an applicant is only required to submit his own affidavit. Addi-
tional documentary evidence on a motion to reopen, however, can strengthen the applica-
tion as it did in Hernandez-Ortiz.
193. 770 F.2d 786, 790 (9th Cir. 1985).
194. Andres-Hernandez v. INS, No. 83-7788, slip op. at 2 (9th Cir. Sept. 12,
1985).
195. Id. Cf. Rojas-Alvarez v. INS, No. 83-7972, slip op. at 2 (9th Cir. Nov. 7,
1985) (denial of continuance to obtain evidence of general conditions of upheaval in El
Salvador not violation of due process since the "nature of the evidence ... is not of the
sort which could make a material difference in the outcome of the case").
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in the applicant's home country. This type of evidence, without
more, will not be sufficient to satisfy the applicant's burden of proof
under either section 208 or section 243(h) provisions.196 General doc-
umentary evidence, however, can have a fundamental impact on sat-
isfaction of the requirement of objective evidentiary support under
either section 243(h) or section 208, when such evidence is submit-
ted in conjunction with a credible, detailed statement of the appli-
cant, or other forms of documentation relating to the particular
applicant. 197
Other Nontestimonial Evidence
The court has recognized that "applicants will rarely have docu-
mentary evidence that names them specifically as a target of govern-
ment persecution."19 8 As a result, the court has carefully considered
other forms of evidence available to asylum seekers.
In Zavala-Bonilla v. INS, the applicant submitted four letters
from friends and a fifth from her union in El Salvador.1 99 The BIA
disregarded the letters not only for their lack of translation certifica-
tion but also as "gratuitous speculations. '20 0 The court sharply dis-
agreed with the BIA not only because it found no evidence that the
letters were false, but also because "it is difficult to imagine, given
her circumstances, what other forms of testimony Zavala-Bonilla
could readily present. 21  The court also noted with sympathy that
the letter writers were putting themselves at risk by writing, and
their fear of future reprisals in El Salvador might influence their
ability to write with more specificity or greater detail.202
Similarly, in McMullen v. INS, the court was critical of the
Board's rejection of letters from the applicant's family that verified
threats to the petitioner's life before his arrival in the United
States.203 The court ruled there was no evidence that the letters were
196. See, e.g., Lopez-Calderon v. INS, No. 84-7362, slip op. at 7 (9th Cir. Nov.
13, 1985); Palacios-Castro v. INS, No. 83-7275, slip op. at 2 (9th Cir. Oct. 1, 1984).
197. See, e.g., Del Valle v. INS, 776 F.2d 1407, 1410, 1413 (9th Cir. 1985); Bola-
nos-Hernandez v. INS, 767 F.2d 1277, 1288 (9th Cir. 1985); Zavala-Bonilla v. INS, 730
F.2d 562, 564 (9th Cir. 1984); McMullen v. INS, 568 F.2d 1312, 1317-18 (9th Cir.
1981).
198. Castro-Magana v. INS, No. 83-7378, slip op. at 6 (9th Cir. Sept. 25, 1984).
See supra note 78.




203. 658 F.2d 1312, 1319 (9th Cir. 1981).
false. Further, the court stated that "it is difficult to imagine what
other forms of testimony the petitioner could present other than his
own statement and those of family members since his potential per-
secutors are unlikely to make their intentions public. 20 4
In Sarvia-Quintanilla v. INS, however, the court rejected affida-
vits from close relatives because they failed to provide corroboration
for the specific threats that the petitioner alleged were made against
him. 20 5 An affidavit from a lawyer in El Salvador stating that the
petitioner risked assassination if he returned was also rejected be-
cause the lawyer did not explain the basis of his conclusion and was
unfamiliar with the petitioner.206 In that case, however, the peti-
tioner's testimony was found lacking in credibility and could not be
overcome by the "moving" but nonspecific affidavits.
20 7
In Chatila, letters from members of petitioner's political party
were rejected when they did not state the basis for their contention
that the petitioner would be arrested if returned to Venezuela. 20 8
They were also rejected for their failure to corroborate persecution
of party members, except for the mention of one incident in only the
vaguest terms.200
Summary
The court's decisions indicate a readiness to accept and utilize
other forms of evidence when it corroborates a particular aspect of
the petitioner's case or provides specificity or details regarding facts
relating to the petitioner's claim for asylum or withholding of
deportation.
Department of State Advisory Opinion Letter
Current regulations governing section 208 and section 243(h) pro-
ceedings require the Department of State Bureau of Human Rights
and Humanitarian Affairs (BHRHA) to issue an advisory opinion
concerning the applicant's asylum or withholding of deportation re-
quest before the district director or the immigration judge can
render a decision on the merits of the case.210
204. Id.
205. 767 F.2d 1387, 1392 (9th Cir. 1985) (the letters also did not indicate that the
group petitioner feared was continuing to look for him).
206. Id. at 1392-93.
207. Id. at 1392, 1394.
208. 770 F.2d 786, 790 (9th Cir. 1985).
209. Id. Cf. Castillo-Diaz v. INS, No. 83-7911, slip op. at 4 (9th Cir. Dec. 21,
1984) (newspaper clipping allegedly describing the murder of petitioner's brother not
probative where the clipping had no date, the names of the petitioner and of the victim
were different, and there was no indication or extrinsic evidence that the petitioner and
the person named in the newspaper clipping were related).
210. 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.7, 208.10(b) (1985). The State Department had a similar
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The admissibility and reliability of the State Department advisory
opinion letters were the subject of considerable discussion in the
Ninth Circuit prior to the Refugee Act. For example, in Asghari v.
INS, the court stated that the advisory letter from the State Depart-
ment was from a "knowledgeable and competent source" and, there-
fore, was admissible at the hearing.2 i But in Kasravi v. INS, the
court called the State Department letter "perfunctory" and termed it
"highly questionable" regarding matters relating to evaluating
claims to protection from persecution. The court noted:
[The advisory opinion] letters from the State Department do not carry the
guarantees of reliability which the law demands on admissible evidence. A
frank, but official, discussion of the political shortcomings of a friendly na-
tion is not always compatible with the high duty to maintain advantageous
diplomatic relations with nations throughout the world. The traditional
foundation required of expert testimony is lacking; nor can official position
be said to supply an acceptable substitute. No hearing officer or court has
the means to know the diplomatic necessities of the moment, in the light of
which the statements must be weighed.2
12
In another case relying on Kasravi, the court stated it "might well
have been improper [for] the Board [to give] substantial weight to
[the] generalities [in the State Department letter] without corrobo-
ration or further inquiry. ' 213 Since the Board did not base its conclu-
sions on the letter, however, any error was not relevant to the out-
come of the petitioner's case.214
Since passage of the Refugee Act, there has been surprisingly lit-
tle commentary by the court about BHRHA letters. In Zavala-
Bonilla v. INS, the State Department advisory opinion stated that
"if [the petitioner's] contentions were true, she had a well-founded
fear of persecution."215 But the Board had disregarded the letter be-
cause it ruled that the petitioner's testimony was not credible. The
court reversed the Board's credibility determination, and conse-
quently found that the BHRHA opinion should not have been dis-
counted.216 In addition, the court emphasized that the State Depart-
ment's favorable advisory opinion was "especially significant" given
the political constraints noted by the Kasravi court and "this coun-
try's economic and political ties to El Salvador, the applicant's home
consultative role under preceding regulatory schemes. See 8 C.F.R. § 108.2 (1975),
promulgated at 39 Fed. Reg. 41,832 (1974).
211. 396 F.2d 391, 392 (9th Cir. 1968).
212. 400 F.2d 675, 676-77 n.1 (9th Cir. 1968).
213. Hosseinmardi v. INS, 405 F.2d 26, 28 (9th Cir. 1968).
214. Id. at 28; accord Pereira-Diaz v. INS, 551 F.2d 1149, 1154 (9th Cir. 1977).
215. 730 F.2d 562, 566 (9th Cir. 1984).
216. Id. at 566, 567 n.5.
country. '217
In Chatila, the BHRHA letter indicated "that Venezuela [the pe-
titioner's home country] has an 'excellent record' in the observance
of human rights and that the political opposition operates freely and
openly."218 The court noted, without criticism, that "the immigration
judge was clearly influenced" by the BHRHA letter in his determi-
nation denying section 208 and section 243(h) relief, a decision up-
held by the BIA and the court.219
Summary
Since passage of the Refugee Act, the Ninth Circuit has endorsed
deference to the BHRHA advisory opinion only in limited circum-
stances. First, the BHRHA opinion letter is considered influential
evidence where the country of nationality of the applicant has a good
record on human rights and there are few asylum seekers from that
country. Second, the BHRHA opinion is considered significant evi-
dence where the country of nationality of the applicant has economic
or political ties to the United States, and there are few recommenda-
tions to grant asylum to refugees from that country. The court, how-
ever, has not yet confronted the most common scenario involving
BHRHA letters, that is, where the BHRHA recommends against
granting asylum to an applicant who is from a country that is a ben-
eficiary of economic or military aid from the United States.2 0 It is
in such a situation that the court will test the continuing applicabil-
ity of the views it expressed in Kasravi.
Applicant's Testimony
Corroboration Requirement
Where the applicant's own statement is the principal evidentiary
support for his or her application for withholding of deportation or
asylum, the Ninth Circuit has consistently characterized the request
as lacking in factual support or constituting an undocumented
claim.221 Rulings by the court have emphasized that the assertion of
217. Id. at 567 n.6.
218. 770 F.2d 786, 790 (9th Cir. 1985).
219. Id.
220. See, e.g., Hotel & Restaurant Employees Union v. Smith, 594 F. Supp. 502,
510-14 (D.D.C. 1984); Georgetown Univ. Inst. for Pub. Representation, The State De-
partment Advisory Opinion" A Due Process Critique, IMMIGRATION L. REP. 13 (1984);
Note, Behind the Paper Curtain: Asylum Policy Versus Asylum Practice, 7 N.Y.U. Rv.
L. & Soc. CHANGE 107 (1978).
221. See, e.g., Chavez v. INS, 723 F.2d 1431, 1434 (9th Cir. 1984) (no "specific
evidence" presented); Shoaee v. INS, 704 F.2d 1079, 1084 (9th Cir. 1983) ("no concrete
evidence"); Moghanian v. United States Dept. of Just., 577 F.2d 141, 142 (9th Cir.
1978) ("undocumented claims"); Pereira-Diaz v. INS, 551 F.2d 1149, 1154 (9th Cir.
1977) (no factual support). The unpublished decisions abound with similar rulings. See,
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fear, without corroboration, is insufficient to satisfy the applicant's
evidentiary burden. 222
In Bolanos-Hernandez, the court for the first time created an ex-
ception to the universality of a corroboration requirement in section
208 and section 243(h) cases.223 Where the applicant's testimony is
credible and alleges specific threats, the court eliminated the require-
ment for independent corroborative evidence of the specific threat.
"If the alien's own testimony about a threat, when unrefuted and
credible, was insufficient to establish the fact that the threat was
made, it would be close to impossible for [any political refugee] to
make a § 243(h) case. ' 224 Although the court acknowledged the pos-
sibility that omitting a corroboration requirement might invite false
claims for protection, the court felt compelled to protect the genuine
refugee who "rarely [is] able to offer direct corroboration of
threats. '225
Two other panels of the Ninth Circuit have referred specifically to
this aspect of the Bolanos-Hernandez holding and have clarified the
scope of the corroboration rule.226 In Sarvia-Quintanilla v. INS227
e.g., Rosales-Perez v. INS, No. 83-7278, slip op. at 2 (9th Cir. Oct. 8, 1985) (applicant
submitted no "independent corroborative evidence of his claim"); Rad v. INS, No. 83-
7832, slip op. at 2 (9th Cir. Mar. 25, 1985) (none of the events described in the appli-
cant's motion to reopen were "corroborated by independent evidence"); Menjivar v. INS,
No. 82-7677, slip op. at 2 (9th Cir. July 15, 1983) ("conclusory statements of danger
without documentary support" and "no objective correlation"); Hafeez v. INS, No. 81-
7453, slip op. at 2 (9th Cir. Jan. 21, 1982) ("no concrete and believable evidence of
persecution"). The Sixth Circuit consistently has rejected an applicant's statement as
"self-serving." Dally v. INS, 744 F.2d 1191, 1196 (6th Cir. 1984); Nasser v. INS, 744
F.2d 542, 544 (6th Cir. 1984); see also McMullen v. INS, 658 F.2d 1312, 1318 (9th Cir.
1981) (INS argued that a petitioner in a deportation hearing is motivated to lie in sup-
port of his case).
222. See, e.g., Sorto-Castro v. INS, No. 83-7690, slip op. at 3 (9th Cir. Sept. 4,
1985) (" 'mere assertions of possible fear'... legally insufficient"); Sangabi v. INS, No.
83-7895, slip op. at 4 (9th Cir. Mar. 28, 1985) ("general allegation of potential persecu-
tion ... [is] insufficient"); Guerra-Magana v. INS, No. 82-7044, slip op. at 2 (9th Cir.
Nov. 19, 1982) ("undocumented assertions of belief"). But cf. supra text accompanying
note 78.
223. 767 F.2d 1277, 1285 (9th Cir. 1985) (citation omitted); accord Medrano-
Martinez v. INS, No. 84-7206, slip op. at 2-3 (9th Cir. Nov. 5, 1985).
224. 767 F.2d at 1285. Cf. Carvajal-Munoz v. INS, 743 F.2d 562, 574 (7th Cir.
1984) ("the applicant's uncorroborated testimony will be insufficient to meet the eviden-
tiary burden unless it is credible, persuasive and points to specific facts that give rise to
an inference that the applicant has been or has good reason to fear persecution").
225. Bolanos-Hernandez, 767 F.2d at 1285.
226. Sarvia-Quintanilla v. INS, 767 F.2d 1387, 1391 (9th Cir. 1985); Saballo-
Cortez v. INS, 761 F.2d 1259, 1264 n.3 (9th Cir. 1985).
227. 767 F.2d at 1391.
and Saballo-Cortez v. INS,228 the court ruled that the Bolanos-Her-
nandez holding applies where no question has been raised concerning
the petitioner's credibility, no doubt has been expressed by the immi-
gration judge or the Board that the threat was actually made, and
general documentary evidence has been offered indicating that the
threats should be considered serious ones.22
Summary
Despite the narrow gloss of recent decisions interpreting Bolanos-
Hernandez, the ruling remains a landmark regarding an aspect of
proof crucial to both asylum and withholding of deportation cases.
The court clearly is aware of the fact that many asylum-seekers flee
from countries where other citizens also are experiencing threats to
their lives and freedom. Nevertheless, the court strongly stated that
a petitioner's allegation of a specific threat cannot be deemed insuffi-
cient for the granting of withholding of deportation simply because it
reflects a general level of violence.230 By creating an exception to the
corroboration requirement where a specific threat is alleged, the Bo-
lanos-Hernandez decision demonstrates the Ninth Circuit's willing-
ness to accept lesser requirements of proof where to do otherwise
would erect "insuperable barriers" to the protection of genuine
refugees. 231
Credibility
Review of the immigration judge's evaluation of the credibility of
the applicant is an extremely crucial element in the decisionmaking
process at the appellate level.232 The Ninth Circuit ruling in Bola-
nos-Hernandez further underscores the importance of the applicant's
228. 761 F.2d at 1264 n.3.
229. Id. Cf. Del Valle v. INS, 776 F.2d 1407, 1412 n.3 (9th Cir. 1985) (appli-
cant's statement corroborated by testimony of relatives, letters from home and newspaper
clippings regarding murder and disappearance of relatives); Canjura-Flores v. INS, No.
83-7890, slip op. at 6 (9th Cir. Sept. 24, 1985) (applicant's testimony supported by an
Amnesty International Report; the court accepted the applicant's testimony as credible
despite innuendoes in BIA decision that he was not believable).
230. Bolanos-Hernandez, 767 F.2d at 1285 ("[i]t should be obvious that the sig-
nificance of a specific threat to an individual's life or freedom is not lessened by the fact
that the individual resides in a country where the lives and freedom of a large number of
persons are threatened. If anything, as we posit it infra, that fact may make the threat
more serious and credible").
231. Id. Where, however, the INS presents no evidence to contradict the appli-
cant's statement, no rule compels the granting of asylum to the applicant. Saballo-Cortez
v. INS, 761 F.2d 1259, 1265 (9th Cir. 1985) (petitioner argued that language in Mc-
Mullen v. INS, 658 F.2d 1312 (9th Cir. 1981) warranted such a rule); Shah v. INS, No.
82-7341 (9th Cir. Sept. 10, 1984) (INS failure to offer its own evidence may contribute
to court's determination that substantial evidence for the decision below is lacking);
Gabriel-Velasquez v. INS, No. 83-7952 (9th Cir. Sept. 4, 1984).
232. See, e.g., Zavala-Bonilla v. INS, 730 F.2d 562, 566 (9th Cir. 1984).
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credibility to the outcome of an asylum or withholding of deportation
case.
23 3
The Ninth Circuit will not overturn the BIA's credibility ruling if
it was substantially supported by the evidence in the record.234 In a
recent decision, the court held that "[b]ecause the immigration
judge is in the best position to evaluate an alien's testimony, his or
her credibility determinations are to be given 'much weight.' "235
Further, although the court may conduct an independent review of
the entire record to determine if the credibility ruling is substantially
supported by the evidence, it will not render an independent finding
of credibility.236
The following examples from Ninth Circuit cases illustrate the
factors consistently cited by the court as key to its review of credibil-
ity determinations.
Inconsistencies
In Saballo-Cortez v. INS, discrepancies between the applicant's
original sworn asylum request form and his testimony at hearing
were critical to the court's upholding of the adverse credibility deter-
233. See supra text accompanying notes 223-25.
234. Saballo-Cortez v. INS, 761 F.2d 1259, 1262 (9th Cir. 1985); accord Sarvia-
Quintanilla v. INS, 767 F.2d 1387, 1393 (9th Cir. 1985). Cf. Espinosa-Ojeda v. INS,
449 F.2d 183, 186-87 (9th Cir. 1969) (if the credibility evaluation rests on reasonable,
substantial and probative evidence, it must be upheld). Contra Ayala v. INS, No. 83-
7610, slip op. at 2 (9th Cir. Sept. 24, 1984) (applying abuse of discretion review to
immigration judge's credibility determination).
235. Estrada v. INS, 775 F.2d 1019 (9th Cir. 1985) (citing Phinpathya v. INS,
673 F.2d 1013, 1019 (9th Cir. 1981), rev'd on other grounds, 464 U.S. 183 (1984));
Espinosa-Ojeda v. INS, 419 F.2d 183, 186 (9th Cir. 1969); accord Solano-Martinez v.
INS, No. 83-7320, slip op. at 2 (9th Cir. Aug. 29, 1985) (deference must be given to
immigration judge's findings on credibility); Otabachian v. INS, No. 82-7416, slip op. at
2 (9th Cir. June 30, 1983) (where the immigration judge has made credibility findings,
they "carry great weight and ordinarily will not be set aside"); Ayala v. INS, No. 83-
7610, slip op. at 2 (9th Cir. Sept. 24, 1984) (demeanor best seen and evaluated by the
immigration judge). Cf. Callejas-Morales v. INS, No. 83-7172 (9th Cir. Oct. 31, 1985)
(objection to immigration judge's adverse credibility ruling may not be considered on
appeal to Ninth Circuit if not raised in BIA appeal).
236. Compare Saballo-Cortez v. INS, 761 F.2d 1259, 1264 (9th Cir. 1985) with
McMullen v. INS, 658 F.2d 1312, 1318 (9th Cir. 1981) (it is particularly appropriate
for the court to consider the immigration judge's findings when the immigration judge
and the BIA differ on the credibility determination). Cf. Medrano-Martinez v. INS, No.
84-7206, slip op. at 3 (9th Cir. Nov. 15, 1985) (case remanded for Board to make its
own credibility determination when it does not accept immigration judge's findings);
Canjura-Flores v. INS, No. 83-7890, slip op. at 5 (9th Cir. Sept. 24, 1985) (where
neither the immigration judge nor the BIA specifically ruled that the applicant's testi-
mony was not credible, the court can accept the applicant's testimony as credible).
mination by the immigration judge and the Board.23 7 The court de-
voted several pages of its decision to a recitation of the facts as
stated in the original application and in the applicant's testimony at
his deportation hearing. The court then focused on inconsistencies in
the applicant's statements regarding such primary issues as his abil-
ity to work and to have access to food in his native Nicaragua and
his ability to depart his homeland.23 8 Further, in Castillo-Diaz v.
INS, an unpublished Ninth Circuit decision, the court ruled that
widespread discrepancies between the asylum application and the ap-
plicant's testimony, even as to secondary issues, undermined the ap-
plicant's credibility.239
Contradictory statements made by the applicant during his depor-
tation hearing were also found to undermine his reliability in the
Saballo-Cortez case. For example, the applicant alleged fear of per-
secution because of his failure to serve in the military in his country.
But the court emphasized that the applicant also stated that he had
never been arrested in Nicaragua for his military resistance, and
that he was allowed to travel outside his country on a national pass-
port.2" 0 In another example, Gabriel-Velasquez v. INS, the court up-
held an adverse credibility ruling by the immigration judge where
the petitioner admitted that he had not read a newspaper account of
the killings of twelve Guatemalan Indians from his same tribe, as he
had previously stated, but had been told about the incident by some-
one who read the account to him. Petitioner also gave three different
dates for his arrival in the United States.241
In Canjura-Flores v. INS, the court took issue with the Board's
emphasis on the one inconsistency in the applicant's testimony.2 42
There, the petitioner testified that the National Guard was given the
names of members of the Popular League, the leftist group of which
he was a member and that the National Guard sought him out by
237. Saballo-Cortez, 761 F.2d at 1263-64.
238. Id. In Zavala-Bonilla v. INS, 730 F.2d 562 (9th Cir. 1984), the court closely
examined each discrepancy cited by the BIA in its conclusion that the applicant was not
credible. The court found that the applicant's testimony about an attack on a group of
striking workers and her own mistreatment by the state police at her hearing in fact was
consistent with her statements in her asylum application. Further, her testimony about
open participation in political activities such as distributing leaflets and picketing was not
inconsistent with her stated fear of police surveillance that required her to hide herself to
preserve her own safety. Finally, her statement on her asylum application that her chil-
dren lived under false names in El Salvador was not contradicted by her testimony that
they used the name Zavala when writing to her but did not use her name publicly. The
court found these discrepancies insufficient to undermine credibility and reversed the
BIA.
239. Castillo-Diaz v. INS, No. 83-7911, slip op. at 3 (9th Cir. Nov. 15, 1984).
240. Saballo-Cortez, 761 F.2d at 1264. Cf. Lopez-Calderon v. INS, No. 84-7362,
slip op. at 4 (9th Cir. Nov. 13, 1985).
241, No. 83-7952, slip op. at 2 (9th Cir. Sept. 4, 1984).
242. No. 83-7890, slip op. at 7 (9th Cir. Sept. 24, 1985).
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his nickname at his family home. He also stated that he was unsure
if there was a written list with the names of the members of the
Popular League. The court ruled that any inconsistency in testimony
regarding the receipt by the National Guard of a written list of
names as opposed to oral statements of the names was irrelevant to
the determination of the petitioner's case.
243
The BIA cannot, however, draw improper inferences and render
legal conclusions inconsistent with the applicant's statement if it is
accepted as credible.2 44 For example, in Del Valle v. INS, the appli-
cant testified that he had been accused of participating in a guerrilla
group, arrested, beaten, and then released by security forces in his
native El Salvador.245 The BIA concluded that his release resulted
because the security forces were satisfied that he was not a member
of the guerrilla group. 24e The court ruled this was clearly inconsis-
tent with the credible testimony of the applicant that he believed
that his release was soley a result of the security forces' attempt to
absolve themselves of the responsibility for his disappearance but
that he did not know the exact reason for his release.247 The court
ruled that the BIA's conclusion had no evidentiary support and could
not be inferred solely from the fact of release. 248
Vagueness
In Solano-Martinez v. INS, the court specifically mentioned the
applicant's inability to remember his date of arrival in the United
States, his date of departure from El Salvador, and the date as well
as other important details of an alleged act of harassment by the
guerrillas as relevant to an assessment of the truthfulness of his fear
of persecution.249 In Estrada v. INS, the court upheld an adverse
credibility determination where the petitioner's allegations regarding
243. Id.
244. Del Valle v. INS, 776 F.2d 1407, 1412-13 (9th Cir. 1985). Cf. Garcia-Ramos
v. INS, 775 F.2d 1370 (9th Cir. 1985).
245. 776 F.2d at 1409-10. His testimony was corroborated by the testimony of a
relative and letters from home. Id. at 1407 n.3.
246. Id. at 1413.
247. Id. at 1412.
248. Id. at 1413. The court added: "This would lead to the absurd result of deny-
ing asylum to those who actually experienced persecution and were fortunate enough to
survive arrest or detention." Id.
249. Solano-Martinez v. INS, No. 83-7320, slip op. at 2-3 (9th Cir. Aug. 29,
1985). Cf. McMullen, 658 F.2d at 1318 (in commenting on McMullen's detailed, spe-
cific testimony, the court noted that he "is either a skilled liar or ... he [is] telling the
truth;" the court concluded that he was credible).
threats against him were vague.2 50 For example, the petitioner failed
to detail the number of threats and he failed to explain their sub-
stance. He also was unclear about the identity of the "private
groups" he allegedly feared would persecute him. 251 Several other
Ninth Circuit unpublished decisions emphasize the petitioner's
vagueness, evasiveness, and nonresponsive answers as raising serious
concerns regarding the truthfulness of his statements.252
Admissions of Dishonesty
In Sarvia-Quintanilla v. INS, the applicant admitted that he lied
to obtain an American passport, that he had traveled to the United
States under an assumed name, and that he lied to United States
immigration officials to avoid deportation to El Salvador. 5 3 The
court concluded that the petitioner's "admitted history of dishon-
esty" justified the immigration judge's determination which accorded
little weight to his testimony.2 54
In Canjura-Flores v. INS,25 5 the petitioner admitted giving a false
name to police and to the immigration judge at a previous deporta-
tion hearing. The court did not deem it necessary to consider these
factors in reaching their determination that the applicant otherwise
had substantiated his claim to withholding of deportation and his
eligibility as a refugee under the asylum provision.2 56
Other Negative Factors
Evidence that the applicant's family members remain safely in the
home country 257 or that the applicant was never harassed personally
before his departure from his country255 are commonly cited by the
250. 775 F.2d 1019, 1021 (9th Cir. 1985).
251. Id.
252. See, e.g., Nunez-Alfaro v. INS, No. 83-7208, slip op. at 2 (9th Cir. Sept. 17,
1985); Mendez-Gonzalez v. INS, No. 83-7187, slip op. at 2 (9th Cir. Sept. 12, 1985);
Ayala v. INS, No. 83-7610, slip op. at 2 (9th Cir. Sept. 24, 1984).
253. Sarvia-Quintanilla v. INS, 767 F.2d 1387, 1393 (9th Cir. 1985).
254. Id.; accord Castillo-Diaz v. INS, No. 83-7911 (9th Cir. Dec. 21, 1984);
Ayala v. INS, No. 83-7610, slip op. at 2 (9th Cir. Sept. 24, 1984).
255. No. 83-7890 (9th Cir. Sept. 24, 1985).
256. Id.
257. See, e.g., Estrada v. INS, 775 F.2d 1019, 1021 (9th Cir. 1985); Figueroa-
Polio v. INS, No. 84-7240, slip op. at 3 (9th Cir. Aug. 30, 1985); Solano-Martinez, No.
83-7320, slip op. at 3; Rivera v. INS, No. 83-7847, slip op. at 2 (9th Cir. May 6, 1985);
Lopez-Canas v. INS, No. 83-7849, slip op. at 3 (9th Cir. Dec. 5, 1984); Lopez-Chavez v.
INS, 723 F.2d 1431, 1434 (9th Cir. 1984); Menjivar v. INS, No. 82-7677, slip op. at 2
(9th Cir. July 15, 1983); Otabachian v. INS, No. 82-7416, slip op. at 2 (9th Cir. June
30, 1983). Cf. McMullen, 658 F.2d at 1319 ("the fact that McMullen's family is safe
does not refute McMullen's claims" given the particular facts of the case).
258. Solano-Martinez, No. 83-7320, slip op. at 3 (resumed work on family farm
after alleged threat from guerrillas and remained for two months before leaving the
country); Ramirez v. INS, No. 84-7500, slip op. at 3 (9th Cir. Aug. 20, 1985) (left El
Salvador after shooting incident but returned for several months and experienced no
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Ninth Circuit as evidence contradicting the applicant's stated need
for asylum or withholding of deportation protection. In one recent
case, however, the court stated that evidence of harassment or harm
to the applicant or his family, while substantially contributing to an
applicant's burden of proof, is not essential to an asylum claim.259
Evidence that the applicant successfully obtained a passport or
other travel document from his government is often cited as an indi-
cation that the government would not persecute the applicant. 260 But
where an applicant obtains his passport by a bribe to a government
official, the court has stated in a recent case that "his ability to ob-
tain a passport may have little or no relevance to his claim of possi-
ble persecution. ' 261 The court additionally commented that they
doubted whether evidence of a passport "should be entitled to much
weight in any asylum case. '"262
Summary
The credibility of the applicant for asylum and withholding of de-
portation is one of the most significant factors in the ultimate out-
come of the applicant's case. The Ninth Circuit will uphold adverse
credibility findings by the immigration judge or the BIA, where the
applicant's statements are riddled with inconsistencies, where the
statements are vague and nonspecific, where the applicant admits
dishonesty, or where there is a congruence of these factors with other
evidence contradictory of the applicant's alleged fear of per-
secution. 263
problems); Balladares v. INS, No. 84-7340, slip op. at 4 (9th Cir. Aug. 9, 1985) (lengthy
period of residence in Nicaragua after revolution without evidence of persecution);
Gabriel-Velasquez v. INS, No. 83-7340, slip op. at 3 (9th Cir. Sept. 14, 1984) (no evi-
dence of any form of prior persecution in Guatemala).
259. Garcia-Ramos v. INS, 775 F.2d 1370, 1374 (9th Cir. 1985).
260. Estrada v. INS, 775 F.2d 1019, 1021 (9th Cir. 1985) (granted exit permit to
leave Guatemala); Sarvia-Quintanilla, 767 F.2d at 1394 (no difficulty obtaining Salvado-
ran passport); Balladares, No. 84-7340, slip op. at 4 (exit visas obtained before depar-
ture); Saballo-Cortez v. INS, 761 F.2d 1259, 1264 (9th Cir. 1985) (allowed to travel
outside his country on a Nicaraguan passport); Espinosa-Martinez v. INS, 754 F.2d
1536, 1540 (9th Cir. 1985) (acquired Nicaraguan passport without difficulty); Palacios-
Castro v. INS, No. 83-7275, slip op. at 2 (9th Cir. Oct. 1, 1984) (granted a visa to leave
El Salvador).
261. Garcia-Ramos, 775 F.2d at 1374.
262. Id. n.7, citing with approval HANDBOOK, supra note 63, 48.
263. Even absent an explicit adverse credibility finding, the presence of several
negative factors has warranted the affirmance of the denial of an asylum or withholding
of deportation application. See, e.g., Figueroa-Polio, No. 84-7240, slip op. at 3-5; Rivera
v. INS, No. 84-7500, slip op. at 3 (9th Cir. Aug. 20, 1985); Balladares, No. 84-7340,
slip op. at 4.
The court will reverse a negative credibility determination where
the factors discussed above are not present, where inconsistencies in
the record can be explained or are insignificant, or where the appli-
cant presents sufficient evidence of the reasonableness of his or her
fear of future persecution to overcome any questions regarding
believability. 2 4
CONCLUSION
The Ninth Circuit decisions have contributed significantly to the
interpretation of the Refugee Act of 1980 in several key areas. Most
noteworthy among the court's decisions are the following: the "well-
founded fear" standard of proof applies to asylum applications; 265
the well-founded fear standard encompasses objective (the fear is ob-
jectively reasonable) and subjective (the fear is genuine) elements
and is concerned with the possibility of persecution;26 6 the clear
probability standard for withholding of deportation is concerned with
the probability of persecution but can be satisfied by general docu-
mentary evidence about oppressive conditions coupled with specific
testimony;267 an applicant's credible, specific, but uncorroborated
testimony regarding direct threats is sufficient to establish his burden
of proof under either standard; 268 groups beyond government control
can be potential sources of persecution; 2 9 political neutrality can be
a manifestation of political opinion;270 and the perceptions of the
government or other persecuting agent is the key factor in determin-
ing whether persecution on the basis of political opinion is likely.271
Each declaration of precedent opens the door to new questions of
interpretation which will eventually require resolution by the court.
For example, the Ninth Circuit has characterized the requirements
of proof for asylum or withholding of deportation to include a state-
ment by the alien of his own particular fear that if persecution oc-
curs he, and not someone else, will be the target of the act of perse-
264. Canjura-Flores v. INS, No. 83-7890, slip op. at 6 (9th Cir. Sept. 24, 1985);
Argueta v. INS, 759 F.2d 1395, 1397 (9th Cir. 1985); Zavala-Bonilla v. INS, 730 F.2d
562, 566 (9th Cir. 1984); McMullen, 658 F.2d at 1318. Cf. Garcia-Ramos, 775 F.2d at
1370.
265. Cardoza-Fonseca v. INS, 767 F.2d 1448 (9th Cir. 1985), cert. granted, 54
U.S.L.W. 3561, No. 85-782 (U.S. Feb. 23, 1986). See supra text accompanying notes
57-73.
266. Id. See supra text accompanying notes 74-77.
267. Bolanos-Hernandez v. INS, 767 F.2d 1277 (9th Cir. 1985). See supra text
accompanying notes 66-68.
268. Id. See supra text accompanying notes 223-29.
269. McMullen, 658 F.2d at 1315. See supra text accompanying notes 123-24.
270. Bolanos-Hernandez, 749 F.2d at 1316 (9th Cir. 1984), as amended, 767 F.2d
1277 (9th Cir. 1985). See supra text accompanying notes 149-61.
271. Hernandez-Ortiz v. INS, 777 F.2d 509 (9th Cir. 1985). See supra text ac-
companying notes 162-66.
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cution. The applicant then must corroborate or substantiate that fear
by his own specific and detailed testimony or extrinsic evidence. 7 2
These requirements are, without question, reasonable ones. But sev-
eral recent decisions have added a new gloss to these requirements of
proof for asylum and withholding of deportation applicants-the
"singling out" requirement.27 3 In Cardoza-Fonseca v. INS, for ex-
ample, the court stated:
If documentary evidence is not available, the applicant's testimony will suf-
fice if it is credible, persuasive, and refers to specific facts that give rise to
an inference that the applicant has been or has good reason to fear that he
or she will be singled out for persecution on one of the specified grounds
listed in section 208(a).27 '
The court has not yet clarified if the "singling out" language is
simply another way of saying that the applicant must demonstrate
the well-foundedness of his belief that he personally will be the vic-
tim of persecution, or if the "singling out" requirement is an addi-
tional and implicitly more burdensome requirement than that of
specificity or particularity.
If the court adopts the latter view in future cases, it must recog-
nize the limitations inherent in a "singling out" requirement. For
example, the requirement renders an applicant dependent on his po-
tential persecutor as the only possible source of evidence that the
applicant "will be singled out for persecution" since only the perse-
cutor knows that an individual has been or will be designated as a
target of persecution. But this seems contradictory to the court's
view that persecutors do not provide such information .1 7  Thus, the
effect of the "singling out" requirement is to restrict the accessibility
of asylum and withholding of deportation protection to those persons
who have already experienced persecution or direct threats of perse-
cution because they would be the only refugees able to verify a per-
secutor's intentions to individually target them. The applicant who
272. See, e.g., Cardoza-Fonseca, 767 F.2d at 1453; Espinosa-Martinez v. INS, 754
F.2d 1536, 1540 (9th Cir. 1985); see also Bolanos-Hernandez, 767 F.2d at 1277.
273. Nunez-Alfaro v. INS, No. 83-7208, slip op. at 3 (9th Cir. Sept. 17, 1985);
Andres-Hernandez v. INS, No. 83-7788, slip op. at 2 (9th Cir. Sept. 12, 1985); Figue-
roa-Polio v. INS, No. 84-7240, slip op. at 3 (9th Cir. Aug. 30 1985); Sanchez-Reyes v.
INS, No. 83-7977, slip op. at 2 (9th Cir. Jan. 1, 1985); Turcios v. INS, No. 83-7802,
slip op. at 2 (9th Cir. Sept. 4, 1984). Cf. Espinosa-Martinez v. INS, 754 F.2d 1536, 1540
(9th Cir. 1985) (must demonstrate that persecution would be directed against applicant
as an individual); Ballardes v. INS, No. 84-7340, slip op. at 3 (9th Cir. Aug. 9, 1985);
Castillo-Diaz v. INS, No. 83-7911, slip op. at 3 (9th Cir. Dec. 21, 1984).
274. 767 F.2d at 1453 (citing Carvajal-Munoz v. INS, 743 F.2d 562, 574 (5th Cir.
1985)) (emphasis added).
275. See supra note 78.
experienced a direct threat of persecution and then fled his country,
or who obtained specific information that his persecutors continue to
search for him, would be one of the few refugees who could satisfy
the additional burden of the "singling out" requirement.
Many other refugees do possess good reason to fear persecution,
even though they have had the good fortune not to experience perse-
cution or direct threats of harm. In fact, many refugees would never
have been able to escape from their countries had they already been
the victims of persecution. As a result, the courts consistently have
described the burden of proof to establish a claim for refugee protec-
tion as requiring that a refugee must demonstrate that he either has
been a victim of persecution or has a well-founded fear or clear
probability of future persecution.276
These refugees document their requests for protection by recount-
ing their own particular experiences before flight from their home-
land, and by presenting documentary and testimonial evidence re-
garding the experiences of others like themselves and regarding
human rights violations in their home countries. For refugees such as
these, the court's decision regarding the permanent incorporation of
the "singling out" language as an added requirement of proof will be
crucial to their ability to substantiate requests for asylum and with-
holding of deportation.
In addition, the "singling out" requirement is particularly onerous
for those applying for asylum or withholding of deportation on one of
the group bases. The fact that others have experienced or will expe-
rience persecution for the same reasons as the applicant is at the
core of an applicant's fear of future persecution on a group member-
ship basis. By definition, the applicant will be unable to demonstrate
that he individually will be "singled out" for harm as opposed to any
other member of his racial, social, religious or national group. 277
Further, while the Ninth Circuit willingly has acknowledged the
difficulties of proof inherent in all asylum and withholding of depor-
tation cases,278 the court has only eliminated the requirement of cor-
roboration of specific facts in the asylum or withholding application
in situations where the applicant alleges a direct threat against him-
self personally. 279
The primary rationale of the ruling-the unavailability of corrobo-
rative evidence for facts of this nature and the consequent impossi-
276. See, e.g., Del Valle v. INS, 776 F.2d 1407, 1411, 1413 (9th Cir. 1985); Lopez
v. INS, 775 F.2d 1015, 1016 (9th Cir. 1985); Cardoza-Fonseca, 767 F.2d at 1453 (9th
Cir. 1985); Carvajal-Munoz v. INS, 743 F.2d 562, 573-74 (5th Cir. 1985) (citing
Kashani v. INS, 547 F.2d 376 (7th Cir. 1977)).
277. Cf. Bolanos-Hernandez, 767 F.2d at 1277.
278. See supra note 78.
279. Bolanos-Hernandez, 767 F.2d at 1277. See supra text accompanying notes
211-15.
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bility of satisfying the burden of proof-applies equally to many
other facts typically alleged by asylum applicants. Asylum appli-
cants commonly assert membership in clandestine organizations or
legal organizations forced "underground" by the government; receipt
of threats by phone or letter; assassinations, disappearances or har-
assment of friends, co-workers, fellow students, or family members;
participation of family members in proscribed organizations; partici-
pation in leafletting, spray-painting, speech-making, or meeting
attendance.8 0
In reality, potential sources of verification of facts such as these
are as unavailable or as difficult to access as the clearly unavailable
persecutor's corroboration of his own direct threat. For example,
family members, co-workers, or fellow students remaining in the
homeland are unlikely to provide letters or affidavits to verify facts
alleged by the applicant.28 l If they do, they may be acting at great
risk.2 8 2 Furthermore, refugees rarely bring corroborative documents
with them when they flee. In addition, many refugees do not have
family members or friends in the United States who are personally
familiar with the circumstances of the refugee.
The court has expressed sensitivity to the difficulties of corroborat-
ing the types of facts common to asylum and withholding of deporta-
tion applications, and has applied that sensitivity on a case-by-case
basis to the benefit of some genuine refugees wrongfully denied pro-
tection by the BIA.283 It is now time for the court to fashion worka-
ble evidentiary rules that account for the unavailability of documen-
tation of specific facts on asylum and withholding of deportation.
Clear evidentiary guidelines from the court would assist both adjudi-
cators and advocates in guaranteeing bona fide refugees in the
United States protection from persecution in another country.
280. See, e.g., Del Valle, 776 F.2d at 1407; Garcia-Ramos, 775 F.2d at 1370;
Zavala-Bonilla v. INS, 730 F.2d 562 (9th Cir. 1984).
281. Asylum applicants are similarly reluctant even to request statements from
family or friends since they do not want to jeopardize loved ones remaining at home.
282. Zavala-Bonilla, 730 F.2d at 565 ("[the letter writer's] fear of reprisal may
account for the letters' lack of specificity").
283. See, e.g., cases cited supra notes 264 & 265.

